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Three stepping-stones have made this thesis a reality 
Stepping-stone 1: When I joined the Master’s program Culture, Environment and 
Sustainability at the Centre of Environment and Development (SUM), it was 
because I wanted to write a Master Thesis on India and India’s deteriorating 
water status. This interest was born by coincidence when I worked on the 
international advertising strategy for Coca Cola at Naked Communications in 
London in 20051. During the preliminarily research, I discovered how the public 
in the state of Kerala in south India forced a ban on Coca Cola. Later, the state 
government of Kerala also backed the initiative. The ban lasted for over a year. 
The reason for the ban was Coca Cola's intrusiveness over usage of local 
groundwater, pollution, and a general lack of respect for the consequences this 
had on the local communities.2 Coca-Cola was held accountable for water 
shortages and pollution in this area and in March 2004 the local community 
forced the Coca-Cola bottling plant to shut down. I was amazed to find such 
power in the Indian public.  
Stepping-stone 2:  The second stone was the focus of the masters’ course 
Development and Environment: Theory and policy challenges (SUM 4000). It 
made me aware of how the world of theory does not necessarily depict reality 
and practice. After travelling to India in 2007, it became evident to me that there 
was a missing link in the theories I had learnt. I was overwhelmed with both 
India’s greatness in size and in the number of people. Norway, where I live, is a 
small country with 5 million people, and ranks as the second best nation to live 
in3. However, the people I met in India during my one-month stay had a different 
kind of vitality, willingness, and energy. India, with 1.3 billion people and 
ranking as the 128th country on the human development index4 , had a diversity 
of living standards across its vast area that intrigued me. I was informed that 
                                              
1 My background is a BA in Graphic Design, Central St. Martins, (London). After graduation, I landed a job as a 
strategist, focusing on tailor-made communication strategies for national and international companies at Naked 
Communications, London.  
2 http://www.indiaresource.org/index.html 
3 (UNDP rapport 2007/2008) 
4 (UNDP rapport 2007/2008) 
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India was trying to leapfrog the most disastrous steps of industrialization by 
investing in the latest technology and indigenous techniques. There seemed to be 
interesting local solutions for local problems and a strong local grass root 
initiative. Yet, at the same time, I was told that a thousand new cars were 
entering the already congested streets of Delhi each day. The fact that India is 
one of the world’s fastest changing countries, that it is labelled as the world’s 
largest democracy and has an increasing population growth each year, made me 
want to investigate more. How can the Indian government listen to so many 
people, consider their diversities, and ensure each individual the philosophical 
principle of equal rights? 
Stepping-stone 3: The third stepping-stone came when I was introduced to the 
Norwegian Institute of Water Research (NIVA). Through them, I became aware 
of the EU-funded project STRIVER, a project concerned with creating a better 
understanding of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). STRIVER is 
an ongoing project (until 2009), conducting research to better methods for 
integrated water resources management (IWRM) in an Asian-European context. I 
wanted to learn more about its core objective, as the project has a strong 
emphasis on local stakeholder involvement, enabling and supporting local 
capacity development and uptake.5 After I walked out of the first meeting, I had 
been offered a job as NIVA’s research assistant in India. I was to participate in 
research, mainly concerning irrigation water and willingness to pay for irrigation 
water. I therefore decided to write my thesis about this topic, irrigation water in 
India. These three stepping-stones resulted in the following research question: 
Why is collective participation from farmers in Irrigation Water Management 
processes not progressing in India today? Case study Distributary 54 of the 
Tungabhadra River, Karnataka, India 
 
                                              
5 www.striver.no  
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Abbreviations and Indian words  
ADB – Asian  Development Bank  
CADA – Command Area Development Authorities 
CAD program – Command Area Development program 
CD – Cropping Design 
CRP’s – Common Pool Resources  
D54 – Distributary 54 is located at the middle of left bank canal in the 
Tungabhadra River irrigation system. 
D22 – Distributary 22 is located in Bhadravati upfront of the Tungabhadra Dam 
and River 
ED – Engineering Department  
GOI – Government of India 
GOK – Government of Karnataka 
IMT – Irrigation Management Transfer 
IWM – Irrigation Water Management 
ID – Irrigation Department 
Jowar – Millet    
KWDT – The Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal  
KWSP – Karnataka State Water Policy (2002) 
LBC – Left Bank Canal in the Tungabhadra 
 
NWP – National Water Policy (2002) 
NIVA– Norwegian institute for Water research 
O&M – operation and maintenance costs 
RD – Revenue Department 
STRIVER – is a three-year EC funded project (2006-2009). STRIVER will 
contribute towards improved interdisciplinary Integrated Water Resource 
Management, based on the coupling and balancing of ecological, social-
economic and policy variables in an Asian-European context 
STRIVER HHS – STRIVER Household Survey conducted in Sindhanur and 
D54 March 2008. The survey interviewed 216 farmers. 72 in head reach, 72 
farmers in mid reach and 72 farmers in Tail end of D54. 
 
TBRP – Tungabhadra River Project 
WRD – Water Resource Department  
  
Paddy – Rice  
Panchayati Raj system – village community ruling system that was adopted by 
state governments during the 1950s and 60’s 
 
Taluk – A taluk is a town that serves as the local government headquarters - an 
administrative unit hierarchically above the local city, town, or village, but 
subordinate to a larger state or province  
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Warabandi – an irrigation water release system, in the distributary where the 
different farmers receive a fixed time with water proportionate to the extent of 
his land 
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Basics concepts of Irrigation Water Management 
The following key terms and expressions are central to this thesis. In this section, 
I will introduce the complexity of ‘irrigation water management’ (IWM) and 
define some of the main parameters.  
Throughout this thesis, the IWM process relates to the control of irrigation water 
from an organisational point of view. It involves the acquisition and distribution 
of water for agriculture (Uphoff, 1986). When I use the term ‘process’, it refers 
to the actions taken by the community or other organizations. The results of those 
actions bring about change, e.g. man-made structures, or the founding of 
organizations, the increase in membership, or specific actions taken (Flora et. al. 
2000). Hitoshi Fukuda defines irrigation water management as: “the 
comprehensive control of such functions as taking in, conveyance, regulation, 
measurement, distribution, application at the proper time and in proper amounts, 
and drainage of excess water, if any, all aiming at the common target of 
increasing productions and improving techniques for farming.” (1976:143) 
‘Irrigation’ is the action of supplying moisture to land; ‘irrigation management’ 
is about the regulation and control of human behaviour, particularly concerning 
cooperation necessary to make irrigation systems function (Mollinga, 2003). An 
‘irrigation system’ is a system of physical structures, such as dams, canals, gates, 
and pumps and management systems that capture water from a natural source 
and distributes it to farmers (Brewer et. al., 1993: 11).  
According to Uphoff (1986), the basic irrigation management activities in an 
irrigation system are as following:  
1. Water Acquisition: the capturing of water for distribution within an 
irrigation system 
2. Water Distribution: the distribution of water in an irrigation system 
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3. Operation & Maintenance: repairing and maintaining the physical 
structures of the irrigation systems 
4. Resource Mobilization: raising the resources needed for operation and 
maintenance (O&M)  
5. Conflict Resolution: resolving conflicts among users and the system 
managers above items 
 
These five irrigation activities are the basis for all irrigation management 
institutions (Brewer et. al. 1993).  
When referring to an ‘irrigation institution’ I will use Ostrom’s definition: the set 
of working rules for supplying and using irrigation water in a particular location 
(Ostrom, 1992:19), referring to the process in which the shifting of 
responsibilities for the water is occurring. Hence, an ‘irrigation water 
management institution’ (IWM institution) is a group of organisations and 
departments with the Government of India, (GOI) and the state Government of 
Karnataka (GOK) at the top level. In this thesis, the IWM institution may also 
include a collective group of farmers, Water User Association (WUA), or an 
individual farmer.  
The Indian constitution clearly designates the responsibility for water and 
irrigation water to the State. Hence, this thesis is mainly concerned with the State 
of Karnataka – and the laws and regulations of this state.  
This thesis is concerned with a canal irrigation system, which is a man-made 
structure, often consisting of a dam, a right bank canal (RBC), and a left bank 
canal (LBC) which guides water through a systematic network of distributaries to 
arid (very dry) or semiarid (half dry) areas. The distributaries can have several 
minors, which flow into sub distributaries, before reaching the farmers’ field 
channels. This thesis will not include research on water for domestic and 
industrial usage, nor ground water, tank irrigation systems and other related 
systems.  
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The following illustration shows D54 in Tungabhadra  
 
    Figure 1: Source: Mai Simonsen (2008) 
The area of study is Distributary 54 (D54).  Data is collected from minor S3R 
being the head reach, minor S10L in mid reach and minor S18R in the tail end of 
D54. These minors were selected according to their location in D54. It is 
common to divide a distributary, into three reaches: head reach, mid reach, and 
tail end. The minors are also divided into head, mid and tail end. The numbers on 
the illustration show where the villages are situated in mid reach of each minor. I 
conducted my interviews there.  
Figure 2: 
Source: Mai 
Simonsen 
(2008) 
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In India, it is common to refer to irrigation projects according to their size. A 
major project has a command area larger than 10,000 HA. A medium project is a 
project covering a command area between 2000 HA and 10,000 HA. A minor 
project is less than 2000 HA. The Tungabhadra River Project (TBRP) is a major 
project. 
In Karnataka, or more specifically in the Tungabhadra basin, there are three 
growing seasons. The rainy season Kharif (July to November), Rabi season 
(January to mid-April), and summer season is mid-April to the end of May. The 
need for water supply and distribution varies according to these seasons.
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Introduction 
This chapter is an introduction to my thesis. I will explain my three hypotheses 
and my three objectives that will give an understanding of the role of farmers and 
the IWM process in relation to sustainability of irrigation systems. In my 
acknowledgements, I have explained the three stepping-stones that led me to my 
research question: Why is collective participation not progressing in Irrigation 
Water Management systems in India today?  
Participation is throughout this thesis related to the idea that farmers are active 
claim-making agents (Hickey and Mohan, 2004) in the IWM process. Hence, 
participation becomes an act done to impact or influence the current management 
of irrigation water. The understanding of collective participation relates to a 
formation of active claim making farmers, who together as a group actively want 
to influence the IWM process.  
This chapter introduces the Methodologies and Area of Study, clarifying which 
methods I have used when conducting research and explaining the context in 
detail. At the end of this introduction, I have included a Structure of the Thesis.  
Project Background  
I was given the fortunate opportunity to take part in the research project 
STRIVER. This included travelling to India for a field study as a representative 
of the Norwegian Institute for Water Research (NIVA), and gave me the 
possibility to search for a more in-depth understanding relevant to my own 
Master Thesis. Choosing to write about the farmer’s scenario in Karnataka was a 
consequence of my involvement in the STRIVER project. While experiencing 
the situation in India, I realised what I wanted to focus on. The farmers who 
manage to influence or participate in the IWM situation caught my immediate 
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attention. Yet at the same time, there appeared to be a lack of a collective action 
force. This dilemma was the starting point of this thesis. 
Although my first priority was being part of the STRIVER team, I was able to 
work my own research into the excursions. STRIVER predetermined the tight 
time schedule and locations, but on a daily basis, I was able to influence the 
planning process to include my own studies as my ideas developed. 
Throughout the history of India, farmers have been the central initiator of activity 
related to irrigation structures and the management of irrigation water. Today the 
farmer’s role has changed and in my area of study the farmer is perceived to be a 
receiver and beneficiary of irrigation water, rather than an active participating 
farmer.  Thus, to understand the essential objectives of this thesis, I will briefly 
explain the main historical events leading to today’s situation. 
The beginning 
In the early stages of evolution, a great change occurred when an awareness of 
the location of water gave the possibility of settling. A shift from a nomadic 
lifestyle with hunting and gathering food to a more permanent community can be 
linked to this. The first known settlements were on the banks of rivers, where 
easy access to water gave the possibility of both growing food and sustaining 
animal husbandry. The knowledge of leading water in a systematic network, to 
irrigate land away from the original source, is seen as one of the most important 
reasons for the sustainability of societies. One of the earliest civilizations, the 
Indus Valley Civilization, flourished along the Indus river valley primarily in 
Sindh province of Pakistan, extending westward into Balochistan province, then 
into Northwest and West India. Learning how to control and use the river’s 
resources can be seen as one of the main reasons why people settled here forming 
communities.  
This led to a steady population increase, where people also spread to less 
fortunate areas with fewer basic resources.  History has shown that the 
 3
communities who managed their resources in a way benefiting its members, 
prospered to become large rural villages and cities. However, with growth and 
development come the need for hierarchies of power, laws and regulations, and 
other ways of ensuring equity and order.  
In India, the legal body and hierarchy grew as several powerful kings took 
control and created empires the different regions. During the 16th century traders 
from Europe realized the potential of India’s resources. They brought with them 
new hierarchies and structures, influencing the existing traditional power 
relations.  In 1857, the British claimed India as one of their colonies. From this 
year onwards, the Indian traditional systems slowly shifted to resemble the 
British power structure.  
The turning point 
During the 19th century, when India was Britain’s colony, it faced the verge of 
famine (1876-78). The British rulers invested in new irrigation infrastructures, in 
order to secure the food supply. The system was modernized by introducing 
large-scale irrigation systems, which could turn semiarid land into fertile land. 
Though primarily done to eliminate the famine, these systems also increased the 
agricultural produce for export, which was a win-win situation worth investing 
in. The British system at the time, a centralized government, functioned well with 
the shift from small-scale to large-scale irrigation systems. Due to its cost and 
size, the responsibility for the larger infrastructures automatically became the 
governments, and the traditional IWM process, mostly managed by farmers, 
adapted to these new conditions. This can either be seen as an “overruling phase” 
(Whitcombe 1972) or an “adaptation phase,” (Stone 1984), and it has, in my 
mind, strongly influenced today’s situation. It would appear to have kindred a 
shift of attitude in the farmer’s traditions. The current situation, where the GOI is 
initiating a decentralization process, can in many ways be seen to resemble the 
situation before the British ruled. Prior to British rule, the farmers were 
collectively active participants in the IWM process. During British rule, they 
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seemed to become less collectively coherent and more individual. Throughout 
this period, the farmers became beneficiaries and end users, with less means of 
influencing the IWM process.  
Today’s situation 
This was particular clear when the degradation of irrigation structures and 
availability of irrigation water worsened during the mid 20th century. In the 
1970’s, the GOI called for more collective participation and less centralized 
control, as they believed the lack of farmer’s participation to be the reason to the 
worsening state of the IWM process.  
The idea of collective participation was seen as the way forward in achieving 
sustainable irrigation systems. The main focus of the GOI moved towards 
promotion of local governance and transfer of responsibility in the irrigation 
management process to the farmers’ user groups. Today these user groups are 
commonly referred to as Water User Associations (WUAs) (Vermillion, 1999, 
Meinzen-Dick et al, 2002, Johnson et al., 2002). However, the success of this 
decentralization process is widely debated. The emerging IWM institution 
consists of several new governmental departments and some external 
organizations appeared along with acts, amendments, and plan to better the 
situation at the farmers’ level. GOI put many resources and efforts (on paper) 
into assuring farmer’s participation; training workshops on how to start up 
WUAs led to a wave of optimism, and the idea of farmers as active participants 
in the IWM process was seen as the way forward. Tools like cropping design 
guidelines; an environmental assessment made by the official body suggesting 
the type of crops most suitable for the area etc. were also warmly welcomed. 
However, what became evident was that the practical outcome at farmer level 
was not successful, and thus refrained from breeding more sustainable IWM 
systems. 
GOI is still today claiming that the key lies in collective participation, and 
recommends WUAs by law, in order to achieve more sustainable irrigation 
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systems.  The failure of the system practised in the 70´s was due to many issues. I 
will, in this thesis, highlight why collective participation is not progressing in the 
selected area of study. The use of the word “sustainable” relates to the definition 
coined by the Brundtland commission in 1987 on sustainable development6, 
often used when similar issues are being analysed. The purpose of sustainable 
water management is simply to manage water resources while taking into 
account the needs of present and future users. 7 I will use the word sustainable in 
relation to the result and the ability the management process has in ensuring 
long-term outcomes rather that short-term solutions.8  
Why is the current situation not progressing? 
Firstly, one of the observations in the field was that the decentralization process 
had not affected the current situation in D54. The farmers’ frustration over a non-
functioning system with several badly handled issues by the officers of the IWM 
institution seemed to result in a status quo situation. There was little evidence of 
what could have been a profitable relationship between the farmers and the rest 
of the IWM institution. What was visible was the degrading standard of the 
irrigation system in my area of study. The problem appeared to be that the 
farmers expected the IWM institution to be responsible – and the officials I 
talked to from the IWM institutions expected the farmers to be responsible.  
The second main observation I made was that the farmers not only had trouble 
participating in the IWM institution, but that the collective spirit or activity 
amongst themselves, was almost non-existent. However, when times were at 
their worse, i.e. when there was no water in the canal or when there were 
violations by other farmers, a collective spirit did appear.  
                                              
6 “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”  
7 http://www.devalt.org/water/WaterinIndia/swm.htm  
8 It is also meant to highlight the ability to maintain a fixed level of irrigation water without exhausting 
the natural resource or damaging the environment 
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The farmers’ main concerns were those, which affected everyone. But when the 
farmers explained their current scenarios, the tendency was to focus on how it 
affected them personally. The idea of a collective way of participating with more 
sustainable benefits for the farmers as a whole was more or less absent their 
minds. This took me completely by surprise, as I had read many similar incidents 
where collective action saved several small villages and whole regions from 
poverty and degradation.  
The lack of communal attitude and action is essentially the main research 
question: Why is collective participation from farmers, in an Irrigation Water 
Management process not progressing in India today? In order to understand this, 
I had to narrow my study down to three core areas.  
I developed the following three hypotheses: 
1. The farmers do not see Water User Associations (WUAs) as a realistic 
alternative to better the current irrigation water management process, due 
to too few benefits for the individual farmer. 
2. The individual act of paying for water is done with the intention of 
participating in a system (IWM institution) more than paying for water as 
such. 
3. The individual choice of crop has collective consequences for the farmers 
in an area, and should therefore be a matter of a collective organisation. 
 
These hypotheses are the research areas for this thesis, to understand why 
collective participation from farmers is not progressing. Even though these are 
the main three issues within the IWM process and institution, the complexity of 
the IWM process is crucial to acknowledge. 
Thesis Objectives 
To answer these three hypotheses I have made the following three objectives: 
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Objective 1:  to identify the institution 
Who are the organisations, governmental institutions, and other actors involved 
in the current irrigation water management institution (IWM institution). Who is 
responsible for the IWM process, and how is this structured at organisational 
levels? What are the rules to ensure participation and good irrigation 
management? 
Objective 2: to understand the role of the farmers  
What is the current everyday life of the farmers in D54? Who are they, and how 
do their needs differ along the distributary? Does the location of the farmers’ 
land implicitly relate to water scarcity?  
Objective 3: to look at the interaction between the farmers and the IWM 
institution  
On what level does this interaction take place? Who is benefiting? Does it result 
in a sustainable future? 
 
These objectives will clarify the understanding for why collective participation is 
not progressing in D54 today.  
Structure of Thesis 
Chapter 1 is a Methodology chapter   
Chapter 2 is a short theory chapter outlining the ideas behind participation and 
the relevant context of the Indian IWM traditions.   
Chapter 3 outlines the current IWM Institution. It focuses on the hierarchy and 
levels of authority: national level, stately level, Taluk level, D54 level, and 
finally the farmer level.  
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Chapter 4 seeks to grasp and comprehend the role of the farmers and their 
everyday lives in D54. It focuses on the differences within the three reaches: 
head reach, mid reach, and tail end. The statistics collected from the STRIVER 
household survey along with my observations, paint a picture of the farmers we 
encountered along D54. This will tie in with my three hypotheses from the 
introduction chapter - participation through WUAs, payment for water, and 
choice of crop. It will also reveal how the participation is either violated or 
followed according to the existing rules.   
Chapter 5 reveals how the farmers themselves are experiencing their role within 
the IWM process. By using the farmers’ own statements, their argumentation 
describes the status of today’s situation in D54. This chapter also relates back to 
the first hypothesis: The farmers do not see Water User Associations (WUAs) as 
realistic alternatives to better the current irrigation water management process, 
due to too few benefits for the individual farmers. By confirming or rejecting 
this, the farmers reveal their thoughts on this concept.  
Chapter 6 addresses how the two individual actions, payment for irrigation 
water and choice of crop, can position the farmer in the IWM process. By asking 
the farmers the reason for their actions, I determine if the somewhat individual 
actions are done with the collective in mind, or whether the action is solely 
concerned with individual benefits. 
Chapter 7 looks at the farmers view on why the current situation in D54 is not 
progressing.  It also reveals what they see as the way forward.   
Lastly, Chapter 8 concludes with a summary of the core aspects of my initial 
findings and research. It also looks at possible new policy implications and other 
ways the farmers can have a genuine participation in the IWM process. 
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1. Methodology 
1.1 The area of study 
The Tungabhadra River Project 
The Tungabhadra River basin is located in the southern part of India in the state 
of Karnataka and the eastern state Andhra Pradesh. 
 
Figure 3. Source : http://www.worldportsource.com/images/maps/india_pol96.jpg 
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During the 19th century, the Tungabhadra area of Karnataka only had a small 
river running through it. Along the riverside, people used the water for their 
everyday lives, but there were no large irrigation systems. Simple lifts were used 
to lift water for small, nearby fields – but these simple constructions limited the 
area of irrigation. The first proposal for a large-scale irrigation system was put 
forward in 1859. The Indian Irrigation Commission put the Tungabhadra River 
Project (TBRP) on the political agenda and in 1944, an agreement was reached 
between Madras Presidency, Nizam’s Dominions (Hyderabad capital of Andhra 
Pradesh, 1956), and the Mysore state (later Karnataka and capital of Karnataka).  
The construction of a dam started in 1948, and from 1953 it was possible to the 
utilise part of the canal system (Mollinga 2003:104). According to Peter 
Mollinga (2003), there was no evidence of local participation or influence in the 
construction or design process of Tungabhadra River project (TBRP). The 
selected engineers considered the physical costs of the construction and the 
whole project was designed without any socio-economic conditions, meaning it 
did not take into consideration the link between the economic activity and social 
life - which the structure should function in (Mollinga, 2003:105).  
Today, the communities in the Tungabhadra river basin in India are facing 
different water challenges in different parts of the river. For example, in the 
downstream sub catchments of Tunga and Bhadra, which comprise mostly of 
arid and semi-arid regions, water management has reached a high level of 
sophistication, both for surface and groundwater utilization in agriculture. 
Nevertheless, over the last decades the Tungabhadra reservoir has constantly 
been losing its water storage capacity due to an accumulation of mud caused by 
mining, dust, soil erosion, and debris. This is an area of concern for the 
government. In addition to this, the amount of rainfall has decreased, depleting 
the water level in the reservoir even further. Water can be released for one crop 
(www.striver.no). Despite this decision made by the top level of the Tungabhadra 
River project Board, the farmers are violating this law by growing in two seasons 
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(double cropping). The outcome of this single action is a serious challenge for 
the environment, which encapsulates numerous serious social impacts.  
The issue of water scarcity and unequal water allocation amongst those who live 
closer to the source of water (i.e. the head reach) and those who are at the end of 
the river, distributary or minor (i.e. the tail end), are very often distorted.9 This 
shows how individual acts from farmers, in form of a simple violation, become a 
major challenge in terms of water use and allocation. Who is responsible for 
resolving this action? The conflict is to be found on a transprovincial level, 
between Karnataka state and Andhra Pradesh, as well as on the lower levels of 
the irrigation system – at the distributary and Minor level. For the purpose of this 
thesis, I will concentrate on the state of Karnataka, excluding information about 
the neighbouring state of Andhra Pradesh. My chosen distributary is Distributary 
54 (D54), located in the Left Back Canal, in the district Raichur and the taluk10 
Sindhanur.11 
Left Bank Canal 
 D54 is part of Left Bank Canal (LBC). LBC is 227 km long, has 87 
distributaries, and thousands of pipe outlets across the designed 240,000 hectares 
of command area (Mollinga, 2003). The designed command area (DCA) is the 
actual area designed by the TBRP engineers that can be utilized by farmers in 
this particular area, which is connected to the irrigation network (Mollinga, 
2003). D54 is approximately in the middle of the LBC and has a capacity of 250-
300 cusecs (cubic foot per second) of water.  
Distributary 54 
My selection of area of study was linked to my involvement in the STRIVER 
team. Collectively we decided that D54 and D22 in Bhadra Reservoir was 
                                              
9 See explanation of reaches in the Basic Concepts of Irrigation Management  
10  A taluk is a town that serves as the local government headquarters - an administrative unit hierarchically above the 
local city, town, or village, but subordinate to a larger state or province 
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representative for the Tungabhadra River Basin at large. I intended to do a 
comparative study of the two distributaries, but before leaving for Bhadravati I 
fell ill. I then chose to focus on D54 and include some of the knowledge from 
D22. 
D54 is situated in the Raichur district, an administrative district in the Indian 
state of Karnataka. According the 2001 census of India, the population of the 
district was 1,669,762. Raichur district has five taluks: Raichur, Devadurga, 
Sindhanur, Manvi, and Lingsugur. D54 falls under the jurisdiction of Sindhanur, 
and the 2001 consensus of India estimated that Sindhnur had a population of 
61,292. 
 
Figure 4. Source : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Sindhanur_Map_2.jpg 
The designed command area in D54 is 87,201 acres, but interestingly the actual 
command area is 108,000 acres, which is far greater than the original design. The 
actual command area includes areas outside the intended designed command 
area. In order to control the amount of water available, and in order to have a 
 
 
11 This excludes details on the Tunga project and the Bhadra project upfront of the TB dam. Mainly includes details 
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plan of the intended irrigated areas, the original drawings focused on the most 
appropriate areas for irrigation, excluding the less attractive areas around the 
irrigation canal. What became evident was that the excluded areas on the sides of 
the canal banks were also fertile, and that with the help of some simple pump sets 
or other ways of withdrawing water these areas could be used as well. Some 
farmers were quick to realise this and took advantage of the undistributed areas, 
resulting in huge consequences for the people further down the canals, as they 
would then not receive the intended water, allocated by the state. 
The following map shows how D54 is built. It shows how the water is distributed 
along through the intricate network of direct pipe outlets and minors. I have 
highlighted the three selected minors, in order to understand the context. 
 
 
related to the TBRP’s Left Bank Canal.  
 14
 
Figure 5. Source: Mai Simonsen (2008) 
1.2 Qualitative methods 
The wish to understand and interpret the current scenario in D54, and the wish to 
understand how the farmers were or were not participating collectively in the 
 15
IWM process, resulted in the choice of a qualitative approach. Since the aim was 
to gather an in-depth understanding of farmers’ behaviour and actions, and the 
reasoning behind their behaviour, it became clear that an ethnographic approach 
would be relevant and useful. An ethnographic approach is a study that seeks to 
understand the way of life and culture of a specific social group (McNeill, P. and 
Chapman, 2005). Entering the area of study with qualitative methods such as 
interviews and participant observation, I wanted to understand the current social 
structures, institutional issues, and way of life in D54. Knowing that it was hard 
to predetermine the exact findings of my field work, I let the farmers’ guide me 
to the core areas they thought were relevant, and these areas became my area of 
research.  
The benefits of being part of the STRIVER team were in total three fieldtrips, 
several focus group discussions, as well as meetings with all the relevant official 
bodies. STRIVER was using a quantative method, a Choice Experiment 
Household survey (HHS), gathering information from 432 households in the 
entire TBRP. The limited sample size resulted in a selection of two distributaries, 
which best reflected the diversity of the entire Tungabhadra River basin. The 
STRIVER team picked distributary 22 (D22) in Bhadravati and distributary 
54(D54) in Sindhanur within the Tungabhadra area. 216 households were 
interviewed from D22, as well as 216 households from D54 in Sindhanur.  
To befit from this team participation I focused on the same area of study. The 
data collected from D54 is used extensively in this thesis, to back up some of my 
own qualitative findings.  
1.3 Interdisciplinary framework 
This thesis is written using an interdisciplinary approach in order to reach a better 
understanding of the farmers’ role, individually and collectively, in the rather 
complex IWM process. Rooted in political science, this thesis deals with the 
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theory and practice of politics and the description and analysis of political 
institutional systems as well as the political behaviours the institution evokes. 
Political science is often described as the study of who gets what, where, when, 
and why, by looking at the balance between the individual, society, and its 
government. Due to the diversity of the current situation in D54, I have also used 
aspects from several other disciplines to achieve different points of view, 
resulting in a more holistic understanding of today’s irrigation process in D54.  
The economical aspect of irrigation water management became more central than 
I envisaged. The topic I choose to debate can also be found in the theory related 
to Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) (Hall and Taylor, 1996). I found RCI 
to suit the main observations I encountered in D54, as the actors involved could 
be seen as rational beings, acting to maximise the attainment of their own 
preferences, where their own preferences were more likely to produce an 
individual outcome rather than a collective outcome (Hall and Taylor, 2006). The 
very idea of the farmer as an individual vs. farmers as a collective group also 
made the economical theory of rational behaviour highly relevant. When faced 
with several courses of action, people usually do what they believe is likely to 
have the best overall outcome for their own wellbeing (Elster, 1989:22). I will 
explore the farmer as a rational being, assessing whether the benefits as an 
individual are greater than the collective benefits possible in a WUA. Chapter 4 
and 5 will discuss this matter in greater depth, using the statements from the 
farmers of D54 to understand the present situation. 
Since STRIVER’s aim was to uncover the “willingness to pay” for irrigation 
water, I became aware of many factors that are influencing farmers, resulting in 
actions related to payment. This became a crucial area for me. I believe this is 
one way to understand how the IWM institution is functioning, and to show if the 
action of payment actually means active participation with the IWM Institution 
and its process.  
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The laws of the Government of Karnataka (GOK) and the Government of India 
today are created to regulate the IWM system and process in a top-down manner. 
Since rules are enforced through a set of institutions to ensure the rights of the 
people (i.e. the farmers), I have tried to focus on the farmers’ right to 
participation in the management process. I have also looked at the rules enforcing 
the economical aspect related to the IWM process, and additionally at the rules in 
place to protect the environment. However, this thesis reveals that several aspects 
of the written laws are unfortunately failing in practice, hence the importance of 
understanding the laws in theory and in practice. This is another core focus of the 
thesis – as the rules and laws are the obligations the IWM institution themselves 
have written, and the rights the farmers have to ensure their participation.  
Environmental science is the study of the interactions among the physical, 
chemical, and biological components of the environment, with a focus on 
pollution and degradation of the environment related to human activities and the 
impact on biodiversity and sustainability from local and global development 
(Wagner, 2007:2). Considering that the TBRP is a human-made irrigation 
system, it was necessary to grasp the basic natural (or partly natural) concepts 
like soil conditions, cropping patterns, seeds and fertiliser, environmental flow in 
a rivers system, and hydrologic conditions, in order to see how the farmers 
position.  
1.4 Case study 
In order to narrow a broad field of evaluation research, I chose to conduct this 
research as a case study: an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within a real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not evident (Yin, 2003:13). 
I want to stress that this case study is conducted with the purpose of reaching 
some generalizations related to farmer’s participation, distinctively in D54 and 
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not necessarily for India at large. Nevertheless, as the general role of the farmer 
is changing, it will not surprise me if there are similarities in other distributaries.  
As I do not speak Kannada, the native language spoken in Karnataka, it proved 
difficult to understand how the farmers are viewing the current situation in D54. 
However, as I was part of an Indian English-speaking research group, the 
farmers’ opinions, situations, and stories where revealed through my colleagues. 
Although it was sometimes frustrating and very tiring, the outcome after hard 
digging and several: “What did they just say?” gave me some firsthand data and 
qualitative insights.  
1.5 Field observations 
During my stay, I went on three fieldtrips in various parts of the TBRP.  
The first fieldtrip12 Tungabhadra River basin at a glance 
This trip was to pre-test the STRIVER household survey and revise it to optimise 
the information. It was my first meeting with the river and its people. I used this 
trip to collect as much information as I could, simply by observing the different 
communities along the stretch, formalising the various issues and trying to 
understand the river at large. I was asking questions in the focus group 
discussions and interacted with several farmers in the field, as well as with 
various levels of officials. This trip introduced me to the conditional diversities 
along the river. The evident variations from the lush head reach of the Shimoga 
district to the deteriorating landscapes in Raichur, where D54 is located, became 
a wake-up call which later made it easier to draw conclusions related to what 
large IWM structures and systems can do to its people. It also made me aware of 
the general issues across the entire river in Karnataka.   
                                              
12 29 January to 1st of February  
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The second fieldtrip13 Distributary 22  
D22 is located in the Bhadra reservoir, ahead of the Tungabhadra River and the 
TBR Dam. It runs through the Shimoga district. Due to severe illness, I had to 
postpone my own travels to Shimoga, resulting in a less holistic understanding of 
the current scenario present in D22. I was unable to do my own interviewing, but 
the six days in field, where I was able to observe and interact with the farmers, 
some of the officials and some of the WUAs members informally, have 
complimented my understanding of the situation in D54.  
The third fieldtrip14 Distributary 54  
With the aim to understand the D54 and its 43.1 km stretch, the initial drive-
through covering the entire distributary became vital. The temperature was well 
over 40 degrees and we were only allocated two days to cover the area. Starting 
at the source of D54 the Left Bank Canal (LBC), we travelled by car along the 
river and down the entire distributary visiting 25 minors in order to choose three 
for the STRIVER survey. The result was Minor S3R in head reach, S10L in mid 
reach, and S18R in the tail end of D54. I conducted my own interviews in this 
distributary, and the main findings are explained in Chapters 4 and 5. 
1.6 In-depth interviews 
1.6.1 Interviewing the farmers 
In D54, I conducted nine semi-structured, in-depth interviews with farmers (The 
farmers and other interviewees have received fictitious names, as some of the 
farmers specifically wanted to be anonymous). The reason for choosing semi-
structured interviews was that I wanted a combination of both factual and 
attitudinal data (McNeill, P., and Chapman, 2005). I wanted to hear the farmers’ 
                                              
13 27th of February to 2nd of March 
14 13th to 23rd of March  
 20
opinions about their everyday life and the situations they thought were crucial. 
Hence, the first question asked during the interviews, was: describe your 
everyday life. If the farmers mentioned specific topics that were more relevant 
than the ones I had already chosen, then I adjusted the rest of interview 
accordingly.  
My questionnaire consisted of open-ended questions and was followed up by 
several alternative questions outside the “interview guide.” In order to cover my 
three hypotheses – collective participation through a WUA, payment for water, 
and choice of crop – I structured the opening questions to direct the interview. 
Language barriers made it necessary for me to provide a specific interview guide 
for my translator, which made the situation for her more comfortable and easier 
to understand as an external person.  
I had made a chart with all the different organisation levels, and wanted the 
farmers to point out directly whom they had interacted with lately. This exercise 
was a good, and had some unexpected outcomes. Two of the farmers did not look 
at the choices, making their answers less viable than those who enjoyed this 
interaction. (Outcome represented in chapter five, The farmers interaction pattern 
with the IWM institution) 
Sampling Design 
For my semi-random sampling design, I selected three farmers in Pagadinni (a 
village in the mid of head reach), three in Ramathnal village in the mid of mid 
reach, and three farmers in Yadaladoddi, which is situated in the mid of tail end. 
(See illustration on page 10 in Basic concept of Irrigation Water Management)  
As I was interested in getting an average feel for a large area, these three villages 
in the middle seemed to reflect the conditions specific to the reaches along the 
distributary. However, what became evident was that each reach also had huge 
differences. The tail end of the head reach was worse off than the tail end of the 
tail end, as they were closer to the Tungabhadra River – and could lift water from 
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that source. In fact, the differences became so evident that I wanted to understand 
the predetermined conditions related to the different locations. 
1.6.2 Interviewing the Board members of the only Water User 
Association in D54 
There was only one semi-functioning WUA in this D54, located in the head of 
head reach in the village Busupur in Minor S3R. Due to the fact that I had chosen 
to focus on the middle reaches in each of the minors, the village I had chosen in 
head reach did not have a WUA. I therefore had to adjust to the findings, by 
adding an additional village – Busupur, where I interviewed the board members 
of the one WUA in the D54. The distance to that particular village proved to be a 
one-hour drive, meaning to go back and forth was difficult. After convincing the 
rest of the team (and paying the driver double), I managed to visit there on the 
very last day. I had in total 3 hours before we had to leave, giving me only one 
hour per person to conduct my interviews.  
I was able to interview the WUA’s president Mr Jaballa, the secretary Mr. 
Sandinoor and the director Mr. Khan, of the association. All three members 
combined the roles of leaders in the WUA with the task of being farmers. What 
was interesting about this interview situation was that they were also able to 
speak on behalf of the farmers. Their opinions on what the WUA is and is not, 
was of course somewhat related to their positions as board members, but was not 
in my mind entirely “coloured.” They where more interested in explaining the 
main reasons for why it was not functioning well. They were eager to make me 
understand the many different aspects of how they saw the WUA could function 
in the future, and told their point of view in such an honest way that it made me 
very aware of how deep the difficulties are in their current situation. 
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1.6.3 Quantitative method, (STRIVER method) 
In order to grasp how much the farmers are willing to pay for water, STRIVER 
chose to use the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), a sample research method 
often used when understanding the willingness of respondents to pay for 
hypothetical projects or programs most often concerning environmental issues on 
a local community level. The name of the method refers to the fact that the 
values revealed by respondents are contingent, or arbitrary. It is more a 
hypothetical exercise where simulated market scenarios are being presented 
(Portney 1994:383).  
In a CVM survey, it is relevant to include a section of several choices, referred to 
as a Choice Experiment. In a Choice Experiment, individuals are given a 
hypothetical setting and asked to choose their preferred alternative among several 
alternatives in a choice set. A number of attributes or characteristics describe 
each alternative, and the possible outcome can indicate what he or she is willing 
to pay for the service or good. Although highly debated amongst academics due 
to its contingent aspect, it is a quantitative way of receiving statistical data. The 
STRIVER team conducted 432 household surveys (HHS) divided equally 
amongst D22 and D54. (In chapter three, I use the findings from the 216 HHS 
from D54.) 
1.7 Reflections 
Language and Cultural Barrier  
The main obstacle during my stay in India was the evident language and culture-
related barriers. In Bangalore, most of my colleagues and other people I 
interacted with spoke excellent English. However, when entering the field, the 
situation changed dramatically. None of the farmers spoke English properly and 
even the officials at a local village level did not speak much English.  
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I had assumed that there would be some English-speaking officials, but again this 
was limited to a few words. Desperate to understand and grasp my surroundings, 
I asked my colleagues to interpret, but this became very tiring for both parts. On 
the third excursion, I managed to get a translator. The translator’s English was 
sufficient, but the vocabulary was limited. I have therefore taken the liberty to 
alternate certain repeated words with words of the same meaning, to get a 
variation in some of the answers from the farmers. The original meaning is still 
intact, but I acknowledge that it is difficult not to distort the meaning, as 
synonyms have a slightly different balance. The most common situation where I 
have chosen to reword the sentence is when I received the comment “and that 
would be very helpful for me.”  
I was always the outsider receiving attention from large groups of people when 
trying to understand the individual farmer facing me. I encountered several angry 
faces and remarks that in some case my colleagues and team reacted to. I was 
accused of being there to exploit the farmers, asked which company I was from, 
and what my purpose was. Moreover, the praising and constant fascination from 
all the varying generations was also hard to get used to.  
Not entirely “one to one” 
To do in-depth interviews in a village context proved to be difficult. Firstly, 
because upon arrival the amount of people that approached us to find out what 
was going on, made it hard to get only one answer. However, the main 
statements in this thesis are mostly by the individual farmers – even though some 
of the answers are coloured by the onlookers. My skin colour attracted several 
rejections when we approached the farmers. As part of the STRIVER team, my 
interpreter and I did however manage to explain the purpose of my interview in 
contrast to the STRIVER household survey. Some answers like “is she here to 
exploit us?” and “how can she possibly understand?” made me aware of my own 
role in this research, and in some instances made me question my own reason for 
doing this.  
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Receiving what I wanted to hear 
During some of the interviews, I felt the answers were being tailored to please 
me – I felt that the answers were what the farmer thought I wanted to hear, rather 
than the truth. In these cases, I always tried to get some additional questions, 
which sometimes proved to be useful, as the farmers – when asked differently – 
answered completely differently. In order to know which of the revealed answers 
to trust, I asked the interpreter to point this out to me, after the interview 
sessions. 
Reality not as planned  
The thought that there would be several WUAs across D54 – like the papers we 
received from the officials said – proved to be wrong in practice. This meant that 
planning the study was generally difficult, and that the distributary had several 
surprises in store for us along the way. 
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2. Theory 
Participation 
In 1968, Garret Hardin wrote the influential article named “The Tragedy of the 
Commons.” In this article, Hardin explains how each individual rational being in 
a local community uses the available Common Pool Resources to satisfy their 
own needs and individual demands. Many communities and civilizations fail, 
according to Hardin, due to bad management of the Common Pool Resources. 
Elinor Ostrom et al. defines Common Pool Resources (CPRs) to include natural 
and human-constructed resources in which (1) the exclusion of beneficiaries 
through physical and institutional means is especially costly, and (2) the 
exploitation by one user reduces the resource availability for others (Ostrom et. 
al. 1994, 1999: 276). Continuing, Hardin argued that all these individual 
demands would cumulate in a tragic overuse and result in the potential 
destruction of the very source they all depend on. Hence the title of the 
phenomenon: ‘Tragedy of the Commons‘ 
Various scholars and policymakers have used Hardin’s article to rationalize 
central government control over CPRs (Ostrom et al. 1999: 278). With today’s 
knowledge on CPR, the essence of Hardin’s article could be seen as undermining 
the natural evolution of humanity. In an historical perspective, the CPRs have 
been manage very well by common people, often better than when private 
institutions or centralized governmental institutions have been in charge. It can 
be said that the degradation of the irrigation management process in D54 is 
failing to deliver water to all of its designed receivers and therefore is in a way 
tragic. However, it cannot be seen as the outcome of many maximising 
individuals, as there are more reasons for the situation as it is today. The issue of 
irrigation water delivery, which is immensely complex, is described in chapter 
two. It is therefore difficult to place responsibility for failure on one particular 
individual (although this is in some instances possible), or on the IWM 
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institution involved. However, in this case conflict is definitely linked to faulty 
management of irrigation water and the lack of collective action from the 
farmers. The aspect of sustainability must also be included in order to highlight 
the importance of long-term solutions, as opposed to short-term. According to 
Hickey and Mohan (2004), the recent broadening of the participatory agenda to 
encompass institutional issues of governance, as well as development policy and 
practice, requires wider debates concerning the State, in relation to processes of 
democratization and decentralization (Hickey and Mohan, 2004:5). 
Elinor Ostrom and Roy Garner (1993) highlighted how many analysts suggested 
that the only way to cope with controlling the common-pool resource was to get 
an external authority such as “the government” to take over the commons (Ibid: 
95). A central management process, combined with the latest technology, was for 
a long time seen to be the ultimate solution. However, as large centralized 
projects failed miserably, the focus of IWM shifted from technology transfer to 
decentralized and user-centred approaches, emphasizing participation and local 
organizational development.  
Collective participation  
One of the main theories behind the concept of collective participation is 
described by Mancur Olsons in his” The logic of Collective Action” (1965). 
Olson highlights the positive side of group activity as he notes that those 
individuals with common interests would voluntarily act to try to further those 
interests (Bentley 1949; Truman 1958; Ostrom 1993:5): 
The idea that groups tend to act in support of their groups interests is supposed 
to follow logically from this widely accepted premise of rational, self interested 
behaviour. In other words, if the members of some group have a common 
interest or object, and if they would all be better off if the objective where 
achieved, it has been thought to follow logically that the individuals in that 
group would, if they were rational self interested, act to achieve that objective. 
(Olson 1965:1, in Ostrom 1999:6) 
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Olson proposes that collective action will occur if the collective benefits are 
sufficient. To further this concept, more participation and local knowledge 
should be included in the current IWM process and as a result of this the 
outcome is more likely to be sustainable, because collective benefits will be 
greater than individual benefits.  
Robert Chambers (1983, 1992, 1994a, b, c, and 1997) described this in his 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA). Chambers highlights the shortcomings of 
the top-down development approaches. Chambers claims that there is a greater 
need to involve the beneficiaries. This is because everyday lives are affected by 
the actions occurring in the institutions, and that the main aim should be to 
increase social and economical involvement throughout the decision-making 
process (Guijt 1998). Roberts Chambers (1983) argues that in the process of 
development, scientists and managers of development projects need to approach 
local people as the experts when it involves where they live and work. While 
outside technical experts have different values and often-conflicting interests 
about specific issues, they often lack the holistic knowledge of interrelationships 
within a given place. Chambers (1983) and others such as Savory (1989) and 
Allen (1996) argue that local people are better in discovering this information as 
they have place-based, experiential knowledge. This means that scientists and 
technical managers need to spend more time working with the insights of local 
people in development initiatives. Development and resources management –
engagement – should therefore be seen as a process of negotiation between local 
and outside interests regarding objectives, goals, outputs, outcomes, and 
indicators for evaluation, rather then an agenda set by outsiders (Flora et. Al. 
2000 in Andrew and Aslin, 2003:17). 
However, both Olson’s and Chambers’ ideas have been challenged in the 
academic world during the last decade, in an intense debate related to collective 
participation in development. The debate arose in 2001, when Cooke and Kothari 
wrote the book ‘Participation: the new Tyranny?’ This book questions the very 
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notion of what participation is. In addition, it looks at the extent to which one 
can ensure genuine participation in development projects (non-biased, including 
all minority groups, equal representation of women and men, young, etc.) and 
challenges the current flawless picture of participation. The definition of 
participation or the ostensible aim of participatory approaches to development 
was to make ‘people’ central to development. This was challenged when the new 
tyrannical approach highlighted that participation in practice had few 
possibilities of ensuring a proper participation. By enforcing participation as the 
way forward, local situations could often worsen, as it spread elitism – by giving 
some of the richer farmers more power and leaving several other less fortunate 
groups of farmers more vulnerable. The authors contributing to ‘Participation: 
the new Tyranny?’ (Cooke and Kothari, 2001) claimed this notion to be an 
important milestone, where development projects were in fact a tyrannical 
practice, rather than a way forward. 
In 2004, Hickey and Mohan came with an extension of the current discourse in 
their book “Participation: From Tyranny to Transformations?” The authors 
believe it is crucial to ensure participation from the locals, since research from 
the last decades have shown that participatory involvement has resulted in many 
learning’s (both positive and negative), which in turn have brought better ways 
of ensuring genuine participation and more sustainable development projects 
(Hickey and Mohan 2004).  
I stand between the two critiques, as both sides have important points. I believe 
that it is crucial to involve locals, as the last decade has resulted in important 
learning’s and better ways of ensuring participation (Hickey and Mohan 2004). 
As Hickey and Mohan (2004) point out, the failure often lies in the existing 
structure rather than in the participation from the users: 
The importance of participation in development can no longer juxtapose the 
alleged benefits of bottom-up, people-centred, process-oriented and alternative 
approached with top-down, technocratic, blueprint planning of state-led 
modernization. (2004:4) 
 29
They continue to argue that:  
Moreover the recent broadening of the participatory agenda, to encompass 
institutional issues of governance as well as development policy and practice 
requires an engagement with wider debates concerning the changing state, in 
relation to processes of democratization and decentralization. (Ibid:4)  
In this thesis, I am trying to capture this particular element and develop a detailed 
understanding of the current decentralization in D54. I experienced that the 
practice of participation from the locals in D54 was not at all ensured, even 
though all the theoretical documents and laws where in place. Today’s’ 
decentralized state has failed on many of the most basic levels. I therefore believe 
that Cooke and Kothari (2001) are in many ways right when they describe the 
pitfalls and limitations of participatory development, when put into practice: 
Local knowledge (such as community needs, interests, priorities and plans) is a 
construct of the planning context, behind which is concealed a complex micro-
politics of knowledge production and use. 
Even though this debate was to cover development projects where external forces 
were involved, its argumentation is also applicable to the development project 
the TBRP Board are now facing with their current situation in Karnataka and 
D54. 
Context of Indian IWM Traditions 
Peter Mollinga’s book On the Waterfront (2003) was my first introduction to 
Karnataka and more specifically the Tungabhadra River - he focuses on the Left 
Bank canal and its farmers. It reveals the struggles related to large-scale 
irrigation systems. Mollinga explains the situation using components in a 
technical, managerial, and socio-political process. This book was a springboard 
for me relating the technical aspects of the irrigation system and acted as a 
general introduction to the canal irrigation system.  
The main task to understand was India’s history of evolving political formation, 
crossed with the history of changes in irrigation practices, as the farmers role lies 
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within this dual paradigm. With this base, it was easier to understand today’s 
institutional IWM structure.  
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) released an intricate study on “Irrigation 
Management Transfer – strategies and best practises” (Raju et. al., 2008) in time 
for me to include the latest research within this thesis. “Irrigation Management 
Transfer in India – Policies, Processes, and Performance” (Brewer et. al, 1999), 
also became essential background information in the understanding of today’s 
situation. Both have focus on India, revealing how and why the shifting power 
relations have developed and how they are received in all levels of society. These 
studies highlight many issues, which I encountered through my own research, 
and are relevant in many areas of my study. I do however feel that both of these 
studies have failed to let the farmers have a say. Hence, in my own research I will 
literally use the statements of the farmers to argue my own and their own case. 
Having said that, I found these studies to be truthful and more realistic than many 
of the older “loyal” literature produced on the topic.  
I also relied on the introductory chapters in Nirmal Sengupta’s Managing 
Common Property, Irrigation in India and the Philippines, (1991), where Indian 
history was richly described. Norman Uphoff’s article Local Institutions and 
participation for Sustainable Development, (1992), as well as his Local 
Institutional Development: an analytic sourcebook with cases (1986) is relevant 
to this thesis. Uphoff argues that there is a need for sustainable local institutions, 
and that this participatory institution represents what Uphoff calls the third 
middle sector, the participatory sector (1992:4) in addition to the public and 
private sector already existing in today’s society. This is, in my mind, a fantastic 
way of explaining just how important the farmer’s participation is. I have used 
his terms (1986) and arguments frequently to support my own and some of the 
farmers’ arguments throughout this thesis.   
I was privileged to be part of STRIVER’s research project, as it gave me access 
to all their research material and data. This collection of firsthand and secondary 
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data has been crucial and I have used it extensively to get specific numbers and 
figures for Karnataka and the Tungabhadra River Project (TBRP). This gives is a 
broad theoretical understanding of how the irrigation situation has evolved in 
India.  
To understand the IWM institutions, I have studied various acts, laws, and 
regulations both on a national and state level. This is explained in detail in 
chapter two.  
It is crucial to mention that during the last 30 years there has been a growing 
consciousness around the fact that water has been overused by humanity. Many 
reasons, such as growing populations and the demand for more food and 
commodities, has resulted in a different perception and a new attitude towards 
the importance of water. Water became acknowledged as a commodity at the 
International Conference on Water and the Environment held in Dublin, in 1992. 
Water has an economic value in all its competing uses, and should be recognized 
as an economic good.15 The reason for acknowledging water as an economic 
good was to prevent further depletion, and hold over-users accountable for their 
actions. However, there are small elites around the world making huge profits, 
while millions of people do not have access to water. Terms like “Blue gold 
“(Barlow and Clarke 2002) or “water is the next oil” reflect the fact that water 
has achieved a different attitudinal status and that there are several complex 
aspects related to water today. This thesis will not discuss the “Right to Water” 
as such, as irrigation water is not seen to be part of the “Right to Water” debate, 
due to its economical aspect and commercial usage. 
 
                                              
15  Principle 4 in the Dublin Principles for Water 1992 
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3. The Irrigation Water Mangament Institution 
Figure 6. Source: Mai Simonsen 2008 
This chapter will give an insight into the various levels and actors involved in the 
irrigation water management institution (IWM institution) in today’s Karnataka 
and more specifically in D54. It will also identify the different levels and the 
theoretical tasks of organizational responsibility- and management, thus highlight 
how the farmers currently fit into the institution. I will outline the key tasks each 
level represents and how practice differs from theory.  
3.1 Organisation levels 
The management of India’s water resources falls under the jurisdiction of a 
number of government departments. However, the primary responsibility for the 
development of water belongs to the individual state governments. The central 
government oversees the implementation of national policy on resource 
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development and exploitation as well as inter-state rivers, international rivers and 
river valleys. The government also provides technical advice to individual states 
on development, flood control, navigation, coastal erosion, dam safety, 
navigation, and hydropower, if required.16 
The Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR) is the principal ministry responsible 
for water in India. This ministry oversees the planning and development of the 
resource from policy formulation to infrastructure support. The Ministry of 
Water Resources is responsible for policy guidelines and programs for the 
development and regulation of country's water. The MOWR claims that one of 
its main tasks in conjunction with irrigation water is to be in charge of the:  
Overall policy formulation, planning, and guidance in respect of 
minor irrigation and command area development, administration 
and monitoring of the Centrally Sponsored Schemes and promotion 
of participatory irrigation management. 
Other central ministries working with water and their designated tasks are as 
following: 
• Ministry of Agriculture: watershed development and irrigation 
• Ministry of Power: hydro-power development 
• Ministry of Environment and Forests: water quality 
• Ministry of Rural Development: watershed development and drinking 
water provision 
• Ministry of Industry: industrial uses of water 
• Ministry of Urban Development: urban drinking water provision and 
sanitation 
• Central Pollution Control Board: water quality monitoring 
• Indian Council of Agriculture Research: development of water 
management techniques 
Collaboration between the various ministries results in a holistic coverage of all 
aspects of water on a national level.  
                                              
16 http://www.devalt.org/water/WaterinIndia/characteristics.htm#Water%20Resources 
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Irrigation Water Management is a state subject. The Government of Karnataka 
(GOK) is primarily responsibility for use and control of this resource within the 
state boundaries. The functionality and outcome of what GOI and the 
departments agree on a national level, influences the general policies on water in 
the different states across India. Nevertheless, all states have specific water 
politics, regulations, taxes and to some extent management systems. The 
following section describes the IWM institution in the state of Karnataka. 
3.2 State Level – Government of  Karnataka  
3.2.1 Tungabhadra Board 
The Tungabhadra project was initiated by the states of Madras and Hyderabad 
during February 1945. With the formation of Andhra State, as per the Andhra 
State Act 1953, certain areas of the project on the right side of the river 
belonging to the then Madras State were transferred to the then Mysore State 
(today known as Karnataka). The project became a joint venture of the States of 
Mysore, Andhra, and Hyderabad (as they were called at that time). This resulted 
in more than 55 percent of the irrigation area on the right bank of the river falling 
in Andhra, where as the Reservoir with the head reaches of the canal system lay 
in the State of Mysore. This situation warranted constitution of an independent 
body, the Tungabhadra Board, to complete the approved project, to look after its 
maintenance and to oversee distribution of benefits to these States (Tungabhadra 
Board, Manual on Right to Information Act 2005:1). Today the state of 
Government of Karnataka (GOK) and Andhra Pradesh share this responsibility.  
In the Tungabhadra Board Manual on Right to Information Act (2005), it 
becomes clear that this organisation has little interaction with the farmers. In the 
manual there is a chapter titled: ‘Particulars of arrangement that exist for 
consultation with, or representation by the members of public in the relation to 
formulation of policy or implementation thereof.’ (2005:71) However, the 
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chapter clearly states that: ‘no such arrangements are felt necessary as 
Tungabhadra Board has no direct dealing with public in discharge of its 
function.’ (Ibid.71) 
 
3.2.2 Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal (KWDT) 
The Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal (KWDT) allocates the water available in the 
Tungabhadra reservoir. The norms for such allocation are as below: 
Figure 7. Source Tungabhadra River Basin – An Overview, Draft 26.12.07.  
3.2.3 Water and Land Management Institute (WALMI) 
The institute is highly interactive at all levels – WALMI is the training facilitator 
bridging the gap between the GOK and its users and includes governmental staff 
as well as all others in the IWM institution. WALMI’s objective is to introduce 
improved techniques in the fields of water and land management. It offers 
technical assistance to the government and advises the government on legal, 
policy, organisational and procedural changes. It helps local communities to 
initiate WUAs, to organize information meetings together with other 
organizations, as well as to conduct special studies for publication on local 
community issues and concerns. The WALMI institute has been functioning in 
Dharwad since 1986. When asking the farmers about WALMI, none of the 
interviewees knew about this organization, but the board members of the Water 
User Association in Busupur, had received training from WALMI. 
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3.2.4 Water Management and Irrigation Consultative Committee  
(WMICC) 
The Government has re-constituted the Irrigation Consultative Committee for 
both Bhadra Reservoir Project and Tungabhadra Project. It consists of 8 official 
members, 8 non-official members, 13 official invitees, and 14 representatives 
from the 2 projects. Officers working with irrigation and co-operation, and 
agriculture departments are represented in the committee. The committee only 
meets when necessary, but takes decisions after many discussions related to the 
specific water issue. (STRIVER, Tungabhadra Basin an Overview 2008: 40) 
3.3 Taluk Panchyat Level - Sindhanur  
This level is in charge of the day-to-day interactions between the farmers and in 
the IWM institution.  
3.3.1 Command Area Development Authorities (CADA)  
The most prominent organisation within the IWM institution is the Command 
Area Development Authority (CADA), set up in 1979. In 1974-75, the centrally 
sponsored Command Area Development Authority (CADA) programme was 
launched. The main objective of this programme became optimising agricultural 
production through better management of land and water use in the command 
areas for irrigation projects where there was a considerable gap between the 
potential created and its realisation. There are five command area development 
authority (CADA) offices in Karnataka, but only one of these offices - the 
Tungabhadra Project, Munirabad CADA office - was involved in this study.  
Here are some of the Command Area Development Authority (CADA) main 
objectives  
• To review and ensure information for agricultural operations and 
necessary services at appropriate times. 
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• To improve fertility of soils and regulation of cropping pattern in 
commensuration with the availability of water. 
• To construct field channels and fields drains. 
• To prevent and reclaim land affected by water logging, salinity, alkalinity 
or acidity and erosion. 
• To encourage conjunctive use of irrigation water with groundwater. 
• To integrate efforts to develop growth centres in command areas. 
• To organise co-operative societies and agricultural associations in the 
command area, to develop and support the existing agricultural co-
operative societies in the area, and to ensure that farmers get loans and 
other services from the societies when needed. 
 
However, one of CADAs most important main objectives is to establish and 
facilitate Water Users Associations (WUAs) and promote collective 
participation. CADA’s task is to help the WUAs function and become viable in 
the command area, thus promoting a decentralized and self-regulated 
management system for efficient water distribution, land/water management, and 
conservation. 
 
The main observation I made in the field about this part of the institution was that 
in practice it failed to interact with its self (each other). The communication 
between the various departments was unquestionably low and the different 
departments did not strive to know what was happening in the other departments.  
3.3.2 Irrigation department (ID) 
The Karnataka Irrigation Department is one of the major departments 
in the Government of Karnataka, headed by the honourable minister for “major 
and medium” irrigation. This department’s main task is to harness surface water 
for irrigation and drinking water purposes. 
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3.3.3 Engineering Department (ED) 
The ED is in charge of the records of tenancy and crops, and together with the 
village accountant makes on-site inspections to keep the information updated. 
(STRIVER, Tungabhadra Basin an Overview 2008: 40)  
The ED fills out lists with information, which are then sent to the taluk office in 
Sindhanur, where the revenue department control that they are collecting the 
correct fees from the farmers. 
3.3.4 Revenue Department (RD) 
This authority collects the irrigation water fees. Although this is an important 
part of the IWM institution, the department does not interact in any other way. 
The interaction with the farmers is strictly done in a top down manner.  
3.3.5 Agricultural Department (AD) 
This department is responsible for the cropping design (CD) guidelines, general 
awareness about agricultural matters i.e. seed distribution, relapsing of the soil 
texture or water availability 
3.3.6 Cooperative Societies Department 
The main goal of this department is to take care of co-operatives at village level. 
3.4 Distributary 54 Level  
3.4.1 Sub Division Offices 
However, this distributary is very long it is divided into two reaches. Maksi Sub 
Division controls the first reach, being the first 16 km in the head reach of D54. 
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Javalagere Sub Division Office controls second reach – covering the mid reach 
and tail end. (Their official staff is called Saudis or Gangmen) 
3.4.2 Water Users Associations (WUA’s)  
A WUA is a non-profit organization that the government is promoting in order to 
decentralize its power to a local level closer to the water resource. Initiated by the 
CADA officers, the intention is that the local farmers and other water users17 
shall eventually manage the organisation and the local water body. In D54, there 
is one semi-functional WUA in head reach, responsible for Minor S3R. This 
means that each farmer is bound by a contract and a set of rules, which entitles 
him to the collective benefits the WUA achieves in its responsible area. The main 
idea behind a WUA is to let the water users themselves have responsibility of the 
local irrigation infrastructure and in most cases the actual management of the 
water. Currently in D54, the RD collects the water fees. However, one of the 
main responsibilities of a fully functional WUA is to take collect the water fees. 
Of the collected revenue 40% is retained, in order to sustain the WUA, as well as 
pay for the work needed on local water distribution, allocation, and 
operational/maintenance costs for the local infrastructure. The other 60% is 
transferred to the RD. The GOI forwarded this in the 80’s as a way of 
decentralizing power and solving common pool resource (CPR’s) problems. By 
establishing a financial incentive, it relieves the government of its responsibilities 
and gives the farmers the responsibility for the local irrigation system. 
The farmers are in theory entitled to the following benefits when joining a WUA; 
• Equitable water distribution among farmers  
• More reliable water supply  
• Water supply becomes more responsive to local crop needs  
• Quick dispute resolution at the local level  
                                              
17 By water users I am referring to the ordinary cultivators of land, individual members of lease-holding farms, and 
owners of private farms.   
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• Well-maintained canals  
• Less water theft/ stealing/ Free riding 
 
There are 835 WUAs in Tungabhadra Command Area. 427 of these are 
registered and 144 WUA’s have signed a 'Memorandum of Understanding' with 
Water Resource Department. Still 408 WUA's have to register. What became 
evident however was that of the 428 registered WUA's only four are working 
well, (CADA office, Dr. S. N. Nayanatara, 2006)   
As mentioned above in D54 there is only one semi-functioning WUA. In chapter 
four, I will elaborate further on collective participation, the semi-functional 
WUA in head reach, and why the situation is not progressing elsewhere in D54   
Nevertheless, the title of this thesis highlights that there is little evidence of 
collective participatory action in D54. It is therefore important to look at hoe the 
individual farmer fit into this institution.  
3.5 Farmer Level  
According to the 2001 census, about 3.48 million people or 69% of the state's 
population live in rural areas. These households are mainly depending on 
agriculture. (Rural Development and Panchyat Raj Department, 2008). It is not 
easy to get an exact picture of the farmers – as they vary from region to region 
and as the following chapter will show, it varies dramatically within the 
distributary. However, there are some theoretical notions of who “he” is.18 
3.5.1 Rational Being - generalization 
If you use the economic theory of rational being; when faced with several 
courses of action, people usually do what they believe is likely to have the best 
overall outcome. (Elster, 1989:22) The idea of the farmer as a rational being can 
                                              
18 This thesis is consistently referring to male farmers, as women are more concerned with the domestic choices and 
drinking water in the Indian context. 
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more easy be understood when exploring how and why the payment for water 
relates back to the farmers attitudes, as well as the choice of crop situation. 
Elster (1989:27) explains it by using the example of choice of crops. When a 
farmer has to choose between two crops, crop A and B, then he has to take into 
consideration external factors; e.g. the weather conditions like rain, sunshine, 
drought, heavy rainfall or market prices for special crops with popular demand. 
These unreliable conditions can ultimately jeopardize the farmer’s livelihood. 
This example shows how the farmer’s choices are in theory: 
Weather Crop A (Rupees)19  Crop B (Rupees) 
Bad  10 000               15 000 
Good  30 000    20 000 
Average  20 000    17 500 
     Source: Elster (1989:27) 
With this example, Elster claims that the farmer is most likely to choose 
crop B as this crop gives the least risk and possibility of best overall 
economical outcome. Many rational theorists stop at this point, but I 
believe that there are also other factors influencing the farmers, not just 
the rational choice of an economical outcome. 
3.5.2 The root of the IWM Institution 
I have chosen to see the farmers as part of the IWM institution rather than 
thinking of the IWM institution above farmers’ level. In fact, I claim that the 
farmers are the very root and base of the IWM institution. Arild Vatn (2007:3) 
explains this notion particularly well: 
The literature offers great abundance when it comes to defining the 
concept of an institution. It is, however, possible to draw a 
distinction between two quite distinct clusters of characterizations 
– between those defining institutions as external constraints or 
“rules of the game” and those seeing institutions as also 
constituting or forming the individual. 
                                              
19 In Elsters’ example he uses dollars – however to make it more relevant to the Indian context I have changed it to 
Rupees. 
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The first approach is the old school of institutionalism and the latter is the new 
institutionalistic way of thinking. Vatn (2007:3) explains this phenomenon:  
Concerning what institutions are, there is no important difference 
between representatives of the new and classic schools. 
Distinctiveness comes first when one considers what they do. 
Especially the idea that institutions provide meaning, support 
values, and produce interests is specific to the classical stand. It is 
therefore socially constructivist at two different levels: a) 
institutions are themselves seen as social constructs – as a result of 
social processes; b) they also influence the social construction of 
man or what it means to be human. 
 
Vatn concludes that, the new institutionalist integrates the individual as a part of 
the system, rather than just a passive participant or receiver. I have chosen this 
new institutionalistic approach, to be the way to view the individual farmers in 
D54. 
3.6 Concluding remarks 
As this chapter outlines, the IWM institution is a highly complex and diverse 
institution. In theory, it is possible to understand who is in charge of the various 
parts of the IWM process. However, in practice, the IWM institution is far from 
what theory claims it to be.  
The following chapter will look closer at the average farmer we met in the three 
reaches of D54. By looking at the individual choices (i.e. of cropping pattern and 
payment for water), it is easier to understand what the farmers’ thoughts are on 
collective participation and on WUAs. Further, I will present some statistical 
findings and findings on ‘who the farmer really is’ along D54. The chapter will 
also look at the laws in place in regards to the three actions mentioned above. 
This will clarify the difference of what the institution demand of the farmers by 
law, and how the farmers are acting in practice. 
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4. The farmers and the rules ensuring  their rights  
In this chapter, the farmers’ characteristics in D54 are explained. These 
characteristics are connected to the location of land along the distributary. Hence 
the focus is on the three different reaches of D54; head reach, mid reach and the 
tail end. Some characteristics are more easily explained through the quantitative 
data from the STRIVER household survey, while other factors relate to the 
intangible social relations or aspects and are explained through observations. 
Interwoven with the three hypotheses from the introduction chapter, on 
participation through WUAs, payment for water, and choice of crop, the 
everyday issues and concerns emerge. This chapter will thus act as a base for the 
following two chapters.  
In response to the findings that show how the farmers are participating in the 
IWM process, the laws are described in order to reveal how the participation is 
either violating or following the existing rules.  In this way the actions is revealed 
in theory, in order to follow the logic behind the farmers’ actions and the 
situations in practice. 
4.1 Determined farmer characteristics, due to the location of 
land in D54 
There are noticeable predetermined natural conditions related to who the farmer 
is. By dividing D54 into three different reaches – head reach, middle reach, and 
tail end – the location of the land determines who the farmers is. (See map in 
Basic Concept of Irrigation Water Management) 
The head reach being closest to the Left Bank Canal is, more or less ensured a 
constant flow of water. This is reflected in the size of the land, which is almost 
twice as big in head reach as it is in middle and tail end.  
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Crop Area   Average acres 
Head:        16.8*    
Middle:     9.9 * 
Tail:    7.9 * 
Total amount of acres based on two main crops in the three different reaches, in Kharif season. STRIVER HHS Data, March 2008 
 
The educational levels vary greatly in the three reaches. The average farmer in 
head reach has completed 6 years of education, while over 50 % of the 
respondents in tail end answered that they have zero years of education.  
Education  Average years 
Head:        6 years *  (15 out of 72 respondents answered 0 years of education) 
Middle:     4.2 years *  (30 out of 72 respondents answered 0 years of education) 
Tail:    2.75 years*  (38 out of 72 respondents answered 0 years of education) 
  Total amount of years divided by 72 interviewees in each reach, STRIVER HHS Data, March 2008 
 
The average household size is more or less the same across the three reaches, but 
the tail end has more people per household and therefore smallest space per 
person. The income is much less as are the general living conditions in the tail 
end areas.  
Household size  Average  
Head:        6, 8 people* 
Middle:     7, 27 people* 
Tail:    7, 29 people* 
  Total amount of people per household divided by 72 interviewees, STRIVER HHS Data, March 2008 
 
These statistics help to understand the average farmer in each of the three 
reaches. The variations in land, educational levels, and household sizes say 
something about the individual farmer and who he is.  In order to get an 
understanding of why and how the farmer participates in the Irrigation Water 
Management process, the Household survey (HHS) revealed some interesting 
statistics regarding collective participation through WUAs and individual 
participation through payment for irrigation water and choice of crop.  
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4.2 Collective Participation 
In head reach, when asked about collective participation, only nine of the 
seventy-two respondents were members of the semi-functioning WUA. 
Interestingly, two farmers said they where in a WUA in mid reach, and three 
respondents in tail end claimed to be part of a WUA. However, in practice, was 
there was no active WUA in either mid reach or tail end, but I assume that the 
respondents might have paid a membership fee to another organisation. The 
reason given for joining a WUA from all the farmers in the three reaches was to 
receive training. The rest of the respondents, 68% chose the option “I don’t know 
about any WUA,”20 as a suitable reason for not being part of a WUA. Several 
others answered that the reason for not being part of a WUA was that there was 
no WUA present in their village. In the tail end, only a handful of the 
respondents had heard about the WUA concept. This shows that there is a lack of 
information on what a WUA is in D54. Despite the claimed effort from GOK and 
IWM institution, information has not yet reached the farmers.  
Nevertheless, I observed a willingness amongst the farmers to consider a WUA if 
they received information, as well as be part of a WUA. In mid reach, however, 
13 out of 72 respondents answered that there was too little water reaching their 
land. To them, this meant that there was no need for a WUA. Indeed, several of 
the respondents concluded that too little water was reaching their farm (12 out of 
72 answers). This seems like a contradiction, when one of the main reasons to 
start a WUA is, after all, the wish to ensure better conditions. In the coming 
chapter, I will use the statements of the farmers to make this contradiction less 
confusing. However, there are many rules to ensure that the farmers are 
collective participants in the IWM process. 
                                              
20 This reason is directly from the original STRIVER HHS, March 2008  
 46
4.2.1 Rules in place for farmer participation through WUAs 
As described in my introduction, the GOI has tried to include the farmers in the 
water management process in several matters on a local level during the last 
decade. A decentralization process evolved where administrative and political 
responsibilities were given to lower levels of official instances, closer to the core 
of occurrence. However, a recognised problem with decentralisation is that the 
devolution of power does not necessarily improve the performance and 
accountability of local governments. Indeed, in many cases, decentralisation has 
simply empowered local elites to capture a larger share of public resources, often 
at the expense of the poor (Craig Johnson, 2003). Theoretically, the 
decentralization process was meant to enhance the participation of farmers and 
local bodies.  
This opened up for a new way of dealing with the growing concerns related to 
irrigation water management. By transferring some of the responsibilities to the 
local official bodies in the IWM institution, the farmers themselves were to be 
included in a more responsible way. Two closely related concepts surfaced in the 
1980s. Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) and Participatory Irrigation 
Management (PIM). IMT is defined by Brewer et. al (1993) as “the transfer of 
rights and responsibilities for irrigation management activities of an irrigation 
system from a government agency to a private or local person or organisation.” 
Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) is in turn, defined as “the 
involvement of irrigation users in all aspects and levels of irrigation 
management” (Vermilion 1997).   
Brewer et. al (1993) clarifies that the IMT transfer process does not need to 
include farmers control of the entire irrigation system, but rather some specific 
parts of the irrigation system and some specific management responsibilities 
(Ibid: 12). Most discussions about IMT and PIM are about the assumed transfer 
of responsibilities from the government to Water User Associations (WUAs). 
The involvement of farmers in irrigation development and management was seen 
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to be the key to a sustainable irrigation system. Because of this shift – many new 
laws was established on both a national and state level. 
The National Water Policy of (2002) stipulates the right to be part of WUAs 
under the heading of Participatory Approach to Water Resources Management:  
12. Management of the water resources for diverse uses should 
incorporate a participatory approach; by involving not only the 
various governmental agencies but also the users and other 
stakeholders, in an effective and decisive manner, in various 
aspects of planning, design, development and management of the 
water resources schemes. Necessary legal and institutional 
changes should be made at various levels for the purpose, duly 
ensuring appropriate role for women. Water Users’ Associations 
and the local bodies such as municipalities and gram panchayats 
should particularly be involved in the operation, maintenance and 
management of water infrastructures / facilities at appropriate 
levels progressively, with a view to eventually transfer the 
management of such facilities to the user groups / local bodies.  
 
At national level – the rules are meant to act as guides, which should be 
stregthened by the State Water Policy acts. The Karnataka State Water Policy 
(KSWP, 2002) states the farmers’ rights in a section also entitled Participatory 
Approach to Water Resources Management: 
6.7. The management of water resources shall be done adopting a 
participatory approach. Necessary legal and institutional changes 
will be made. The ultimate goal will be to transfer operation, 
maintenance, management and collection of water taxs to users 
groups [WUAs]. 
6.8 Minor Irrigation works and sub-systems of Major & Medium 
Irrigation works will be rehabilitated with participation by the 
users of these tanks and subsystems and handed over to Users 
Organization [WUAs] for operation, maintenance and 
management. Technical assistance will be rendered to Water Users 
Associations and they will be encouraged to undertake land 
levelling and also take up cultivation of high value crops requiring 
less water for efficient use of scarce water. 
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The KSWP specifies the law in detail, as well as explaining the functions of 
WUAs:  
6.9 To create awareness among citizens on decentralization user 
participation and involvement in decision-making, implementation 
and management of water resources projects, campaigns will be 
undertaken.  
The lack of knowledge and information about the benefits farmers can achieve 
when being a part of a WUA and of a collective action, is making it hard to 
blame the farmers in D54. However, the semi-functioning WUA in head reach 
suggests that it is possible to achieve an association, if proper effort is put into 
the realization of the WUA. The next chapter will reveal how this WUA is 
struggling due to the lack of farmers’ ability to cooperate collectively between 
themselves, and more importantly how the lack of consent from the CADA office 
is holding its authority back. 
Another important individual action, where the farmers are interacting with the 
IWM institution is when the farmers choose to pay or choose not to pay, for their 
irrigation water.  
4.3 Payment for irrigation water 
There was an understanding in all the reaches that farmers should pay the water 
fee. 
Reach   Average  %   Paid in which year 
Head:        83 % (60 out of 72 farmers)  2001 – 2008   (most paid in 2007) 
Middle:     84% (61out of 72 farmers)  2000 – 2007 (most paid in 2007) 
Tail:    93% (67 out of 72 farmers)  1975 – 2007 (most paid in 2007) 
STRIVER HHS Data, March 2008 
The fact that most of the farmers have paid fees within the recent years is a good 
indication for how this particular part of the IWM process is functioning. 
However, it does not indicate that the farmers are doing this on a regular basis, 
nor does it reveal the reasons behind why the farmers are paying, or not paying 
 49
the water fee. I will follow this up in the next chapter – when the farmers tell me 
their intentions.  
4.4 Rules in place for payment for water  
Since the issue of payment is decided on a state level, the KSWP (2002) 
describes what the rates are “meant” to be used for:  
6.15 Water rates for various uses will be revised in a phased 
manner and fixed so as to cover at least the operation and 
maintenance charges of providing services 
Hence, the water rates are meant to cover the operation and maintenance (O&M) 
cost in the area where the official body is providing water. These costs vary from 
state to state – and drastically within the states. Where there is a lack of water 
and the infrastructure is hard to maintain, the water rates are high. In the semiarid 
states and regions, like Raichur and D54, the water rates should be much higher 
than they are today. The reason for low water rates is so that everyone in the 
system – poor and rich can pay. However, the fees are not enough to ensure 
proper O&M, resulting in a fast deteriorating irrigation infrastructure. 
To understand the procedure the following list illustrates the current irrigation 
prices in TBRP area: 
 
Water Rates - 2004-05 Per hectare Per acre  
Crop   
Sugarcane 988,45 400
Paddy 247,1 100
Cotton 148,1 60
Horticulture 148,25 60
Wheat 148,25 60
Groundnut 148,25 60
Sunflower 148,25 60
Jowar, Maize, Navane, 
Arekushki crops  86,5 35
Grains 86,5 35
Tobacco 86,5 35
Fertilizer crops 37,05 15
Others 86,5 35
Figure 8. Source: STRIVER TB water utilization, ISEC, 2008 
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This shows how the water fees relate to the specific crops. The water fees are not 
based on a volumetric pricing facility, but rather on the size of land and the type 
of crop, which the farmer has chosen. Since sugarcane and paddy are water-
intensive crops (paddy needs to stand in water), the price per acre is much higher 
than for less water-intensive crops such as cotton or maize.  
By not paying for water, farmers choose not to contribute to the IWM institution 
and its development. This, in turn, affects the distributary as a whole. The farmer 
will be looked upon as an encroacher or a free rider – receiving water but not 
paying for it. There are rules for those who steal water and chose not paying- this 
is labelled as illegal water withdrawals. I found that the current KWSP (2002) 
specifically mentions how to deal with this issue related to non-payment. In the 
section ‘On Removal & Prevention of Encroachments’ 
6.17 Unauthorised pumping / lifting / siphoning of water from main 
canals, branch canals distributaries will be prevented.  
During the initial walkthrough along D54, we encountered several unauthorized 
pump sets, which made me think that there are holes in the monitoring. However, 
when I asked the gangman Mr. Ramapapy what he would do about it, he just 
laughed and did not want to talk about it. His duty, according to law, was to 
remove the pump sets, but that did not seem to his intended plan. 
It was brought to my attention that there was a possibility of receiving a bank 
loan when you had a receipt showing that you had paid for your water. This 
incentive is one of the reasons why many of the farmers pay the fee. I will return 
to this matter in chapter six.  
Although there are several ways of judging the progress of collective 
participation, the following section shows how the current individual action of 
choice of crop is a matter of collective interest with consequences for the rest of 
the farmers and the IWM process. 
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4.5 The individual choice of crop - Cropping patterns 
The most common types of crops grown in D54 are the following: 
Reach     Main crop     Second crop    
Head:        Paddy (rice) grown in both seasons  Paddy grown in both seasons 
Middle:     Jowar and Paddy (mainly Kharif season) Sunflower, Jowar and Cotton 
Tail:    Sunflower and Jowar (mainly Kharif season) Sunflower, Jowar and Cotton 
         STRIVER HHS Data, March 2008 
 
What this proves is that where there is water – i.e. in the head reach – the farmers 
utilize this potential fully by growing the most water-intensive crop: rice. Head 
reach farmers also grow rice in both Kharif and Rabi season, which makes the 
water conditions further down the stream harder in the Rabi season, when the 
water release is at a minimum. It is also important to acknowledge that the 
middle reach grows rice in Kharif season, although, there is a greater tendency to 
grow jowar (millet) which is much less water-intensive. In fact, out of the 72 
farmers asked in head reach, 95, 8% of the farmers grow in both Kharif and Rabi 
season, also referred to as double cropping. In mid reach, only 44% of farmers 
grow in both seasons. In tail end, 31.9 % of the farmers grow in both seasons. 
This shows how adaptation to the water availability occurs naturally in the three 
reaches – and determines the choice of crop. 
In tail end you find mainly sunflower, cotton, and jowar – all of which are low 
water-intensive crops. Little grows in tail end during Rabi season and the farmers 
here told me that they mainly work as labourers for other farmers during this 
season. I observed completely dry canals of about 30 km in D54 during my stay 
– meaning that there must be several areas without a drop of water in the tail end 
area. There are alternative sources of water. Borewell water, which pumps up 
groundwater, is one such alternative. Another is a so-called lift irrigation system, 
which pumps water from a source far away and into the field canals with the help 
of gasoline power. This was observed to be mainly in use in mid reach and in tail 
end, but also in the head reach. However, the use of borewell water leaves the 
farmer restricted, as it is hard to cover large quantities of area with such an 
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irrigation facility. The borewell water is throughout the distributary used for 
drinking purposes – meaning that the farmers are using valuable water essential 
for sustaining their family’s livelihood, to grow a couple of acres of crop. In head 
reach, the farmers are growing almost the same amount of paddy and earning just 
as much money in both seasons21. This shows the differences related to the 
management of irrigation water as such, and the task the government has in 
ensuring water to all of the farmers along the distributary. 
4.5.1 Rules for ensuring that the Cropping Design is followed 
As mentioned above, the different crops represent different water intensities. 
This, together with the available irrigation water, has to be taken into 
consideration when the farmers choose their crop. Each year the CADA office in 
Karnataka prepares the official cropping design for TBRP command area. This is 
meant to be shown to all the farmers in the designed area and thus followed by 
the farmer. This guideline is based on water availability and soil conditions 
within the distributary. 
The initial cropping pattern design produced in the 60s is still being used as the 
starting point for the ‘new’ CD each year.  
Dist.54 
1960-70 
Distributary 
km 
Distributary 
Water 
discharge 
Cusecs 
Paddy Areca 
nut 
Cotton Kharif Rabi Total 
Acres  
Dist.54 Head 
reach * 
16.1 381 781 318 3073 6461 7183 17816 
Dist.54 Mid 
reach and tail 
end * 
27.1 - 1490 1008 12995 25347 28428 69385 
Figure 9. Source: Irrigation Department meeting 18.03.2008 
                                              
21 Based on data from STRIVER household survey, March 2008 
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What became evident was that neither the farmers nor the officials with land 
along the stretch follow the guidelines – even though there are several laws on 
this matter. 
One of these laws is the Karnataka Irrigation Act 1965 (amended in 2000), 
mentioning the following on CD: 
32. Power to prescribe the kind of crop to be grown under the 
irrigation area and the period of sowing such crop.-  
(1) Whenever the State Government is satisfied that for the better 
cultivation of lands and due preservation of the water-resources of 
an irrigation work, it is expedient and desirable in public interests 
to regulate the kind of crop that should be grown on lands under 
such irrigation work and the period of sowing such kinds of crop, it 
may, by notification, make a declaration to that effect.  
(2) On the making of a declaration under sub-section (1), the 
Irrigation Officer, after consultation with the committee appointed 
under section 27 and with the approval of the Deputy 
Commissioner, may specify by notification published in such 
manner as may be prescribed, the kinds of crop that shall be grown 
on any land under such irrigation work and the period of sowing 
and planting such crops.  
(3) On the publication of a notification under sub-section (2), no 
person shall grow or allow any crop other than the crops specified 
in such notification to be grown on any land under such irrigation 
work and no person shall sow or plant or allow the sowing or 
planting of crop at any time other than during the period specified 
in such notification.  
1[(4) In all cases in which the person who has sown or grown any 
unauthorised crop or allowed any land to be grown or sown with 
such unauthorised crop cannot be found the holder of land, in 
addition to such other person concerned, shall,-  
(a) be liable for contravening the provisions of this section; and  
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(b) also be liable to pay such water rate, 2[or water charges as the 
case may be]2 as may be determined by the Irrigation Officer, not 
being less than the five times and not exceeding ten times the water 
rate 2[or water charges as the case may be]2 which he would 
otherwise have been required to pay: Provided that if no water is 
utilised either directly or indirectly from the irrigation work for 
growing any crop, the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) shall 
not be applicable.]1 1. Substituted by Act 12 of 1969 w.e.f. 
19.6.1969,2. Inserted by Act 24 of 2000 w.e.f. 14.6.2000. 
The rules for not following the cropping patterns are, in theory, strict. If the CD 
is not followed and violations occur, the punishment the officials can issue are 
clearly outlined in the rules above. When I asked the CADA officers why all the 
farmers are breaking such an elementary part of the IWM process, their reaction 
was to laugh aloud and tell jokes about how they themselves are not following 
the CD. Hence, the reason that the present CD still exists – is so the GOK can say 
that they have done their duty as officials and provided a design based on the 
water availability and soil conditions in all areas. In doing so, the blame for the 
current water scarcity scenario is forwarded to the farmers. However, as the 
following chapter will highlight, none of the interviewed farmers have seen the 
cropping design, and though many of the farmers are breaking the law, there are 
no legal enforcements or punishments for those who do not follow the CD.  
There have been several attempts to ensure an equitable distribution of water to 
all the lands under each outlet of the command area. The most successful is the 
Warabandi system. In this governmental controlled system, each farmer gets 
water turn by turn for a fixed time, in intervals proportionate to the extent of their 
land. The NWP (2002) suggests the Warabandi system as a solution to ensure 
better equality of water sharing, regardless of location. 
9.3 Water allocation in an irrigation system should be done with 
due regard to equity and social justice. Disparities in the 
availability of water between head-reach and tail-end farms and 
between large and small farms should be obviated by adoption of a 
rotational water distribution system and supply of water on a 
volumetric basis subject to certain ceilings and rational pricing. 
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In practice, this system works in head and mid reach in D54, but water scarcity 
and management issues are still occurring. In the tail end, where the situation is 
the worse, the system is vaguely present (only 10 out of 72 farmers informed that 
there was a Warabandi system in their minor). 
4.6 Concluding remarks 
In head reach, problems and issues were small. Here the education level was 
high, there were good drinking water facilities, there were large plots with an 
average of 16.8 acres, and one semi-functioning Water User Association (WUA). 
With more or less constant flow of water, the farmers grow water-intensive crops 
such as rice and sugarcane, and choose to grow in both Kharif and Rabi 
seasons22. Another interesting issue was that this area had little interaction with 
officials at lower levels. My main impression was that there was a wish to be 
included in the officials’ daily business related to irrigation water management.  
In the middle reach, issues related to water became more prominent. The latest 
assessment made by the Irrigation department, shows about 36,470 out of 69,000 
acres of localised area in second reach acres are found to be suffering from lack 
of availability of canal water (Tail-enders and Other Deprived in the Canal Water 
Distribution, GOI, 2003:9). The farmers in mid reach have less land than in head 
reach. There was a tendency to grow water-intensive rice in Kharif season and 
less water intensive crops in Rabi season. 
Robert Chambers states that the deprivation of tail end is notorious, (1988:21) 
and this is confirmed repeatedly in most cases where IWM is studied. The tail 
end is at the end of main canals, branch canals, distributaries, minors, or field 
watercourses – tail enders suffer the most. Deprivation can be different issues - 
sometimes it can be excess water or seepage. Nevertheless, often, deprivation 
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means to receive too little water, to receive the water too late, or, indeed, to 
receive no water at all (Ibid: 21). This particular situation is due to the specific 
location at the tail end of the waterway. In the case of D54 the tail enders are 
definitely worst off. They have much less land, grow low water-intensive crops, 
and receive a much smaller income than farmers from the middle reach and head 
reach. Knowing that the natural conditions are harder in tail end areas, the IWM 
institution is responsible for ensuring water to this reach.  
The following chapter allows the farmers to voice their concerns and thoughts on 
what they see to be the issues related collective participation, choice of crop and 
payment for water. 
 
 
22 Kharif is the summer season which lasts between April and September. Rabi season goes from October to 
December. The State of Karnataka also operates with a third season: the summer season from January to March. But 
very few farmers grow in this season.  
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5. Collective Participation   
This chapter will reveal how the farmers themselves are experiencing their role 
within the IWM process. By using the farmers’ own statements, their 
argumentation reveals the status of today’s situation in D54.  
The first section of this chapter will identify whom the farmers are interacting 
with, and what these interactions result in. This will make it easier to identify 
current holes in the IWM institution and give a better understanding of what the 
farmers feel that they are influencing in addition to being a part of.  
This chapter will also relate back to the hypothesis: The farmers do not see Water 
User Associations (WUAs) as realistic alternatives to better the current irrigation 
water management process, due to too few benefits for the individual farmers. By 
confirming or rejecting this, the farmers reveal their thoughts on collective 
participation through WUAs, as well as how they relate to this concept.  
5.1 The farmers interaction pattern with the IWM institution 
I asked the farmers to point out to me which officials and organisations they had 
interacted with in the last years. The following results were uncovered: 
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The farmers identified that the main sphere of actors who are involved in their 
everyday lives, were at taluk level. It was not that the farmers where unaware of 
the existing IWM institution, only that daily interactions were limited to the 
departments within this level.  
Although the study sample size is small, it gives an indication of whom the 
farmers mostly interact with in the IWM institution. The irrigation department 
(ID), revenue department (RD), and the CADA officers are the three departments 
that the interviewees said they had interacted with the most.  
What became evident was that there was no identification of the officials at the 
lower levels. The little interaction with the gangmen and those who in theory 
should have the most contact with the farmers, proposed a questionable situation. 
I had assumed that there would have been more interaction between the lower 
levels and the farmers, but the following revelation was now a challenge to 
follow up in all the three reaches. My main assumption was that in head reach 
there would be more interaction and awareness with both officials and the IWM 
institution. Further, down D54, I presumed there would be less awareness and 
interaction. 
5.1.1 The lack of IWM official staff  
In D54, there are two division offices, first reach Maski Sub Division office, 
which is in charge of head reach (0-16 km). The second division office is 
Javalagere Sub Division Office. Their responsibility is mid reach and tail end 17- 
43.2 km. The sub division officers accompanied the STRIVER team during the 
fieldwork. Ironically, the officers had not visited all the villages we had on our 
list. This became evident when several farmers revealed that they had never 
spoken to the lower levels of the IWM institution. Mr. Avinandan Singh in the 
head reach explained:  
“Some people [from the official bodies] come in between, maybe 
twice a year, but there is hardly any interaction with officials.”  
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Mr. Singh pointed on the chart and said he had interacted with RD, ID and 
CADA, but no interaction with Saudis or gangmen23. Another farmer in head 
reach Mr. Pradip Yani confirmed this, as he made it clear that there is:  
“Not much interaction with any of the departments, but I am not 
concerned. Since the revenue department is getting their money it 
benefits us all and we are happy with the conditions.” Continuing 
Mr. Yani said, “If we have any problems, we approach them [the 
officials]. They never come here to speak to us on our issues.”  
The assumption by the farmers that as long as the water fees are paid – 
everything will stay the same as it is - indicates that the conditions are good in 
the head reach. 
The reactions where different in mid reach, where a frustrated Mr. Krishna Babu 
wanted to know where to go with his different problems and issues. He meant 
that there was a lack of officials to interact directly with, when wanting to solve 
his issues. 
“These people from CADA and their departments or other 
institutions, should came and talk to us. They should come here 
more frequently, but our issues are not a matter to them. I have 
interacted with several institutions, [he points to ID, CADA, 
Executive Engineer, Saudi/gangmen, and WUA on the chart], but I 
would not say that it has had any huge impact on my situation.” 24 
Mr Babu wants more interaction, and action related to communication with 
officials. A frustrated Mr Babu did not know how he could relate the status of the 
mid reach conditions to get response. Farmers from all the three interviews done 
in mid reach were of the same mind. In the tail end Mr. Avin Vinjay was of a 
different opinion:  
“We [tail-enders] do not approach anyone. They [the officials] tell 
us to be in an association and that we should cooperate, but this 
has not happened here yet.”  
                                              
23 Interview done on 20.03.08 
24 Interview 21.03.08 
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A fellow farmer, Mr. Rajeev Khan was the only farmer from those interviewed, 
who had approached a member of the lower levels of the IWM institution.  
“When we have a water scarcity issue we go to the gangmen or the 
canal-supervisor and ask them to increase the gauges. They 
normally do. […] If a farmer did this [controlling the gauges], they 
would fight with each other. This is why we are experiencing 
difficulties in the existing Warabandi system, where some of the 
farmers are in charge of releasing the gauges. I would prefer the 
ID should do this job, not the farmers”  
Mr Rajeev questions the ability of the farmers to actively manage the last 
instance of the IWM process, and is not pleased with the situation as it is today. 
He expressed that he felt threatened by the current situation, as it leaves him 
vulnerable and a competitor to the other farmers, rather than an empowered part 
of a group. Wanting to be part of a functioning IWM institution with clear roles 
and rules, seem to be Mr. Rajeev’s main aim in the tail end. 
This reveals that not all of the farmers feel they need to be included or have a 
prominent voice in the management process, (at least not at the tail end). On the 
contrary, they prefer that the officials deal with the infrastructure, the allocation, 
and release of water. Empowerment and participation from the farmers is not 
necessary their own wish. Their wish is for a working institutional setting where 
they are the benefiting receivers. Today’s rules laid out in chapter three, states 
that in theory the farmers should be active. In practise however, this is not 
happening.  
When researching in more depth, I realised that there were many hinders outside 
the IWM institution. These problems were related to the institution, but in a more 
human way. For example corruption from the official side, free riding where 
some farmers take the liberty to withdraw water but not pay for it, crop violations 
and double cropping resulting in less water for the farmers in the tail end in both 
seasons. These individual actions have individual benefits, but the consequences 
affect the entire distributary collectively. The most surprising hinder, was the 
notion of a strong individual farmer, speaking about his fellow farmers as ‘we or 
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us,’ but where collective action with the other farmers could not be seen. This 
lack of collective participation led me to the hypothesis that: ‘The farmers do not 
see Water User Associations (WUAs) as realistic alternatives to better the 
current irrigation water management process, due to too few benefits for the 
individual farmers.’ The following section will investigate this thought further. 
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5.2 Why should the farmers participate collectively? 
 “Through the association we will be strong. It is much better than 
being just individual farmers”25 Mr. Jabbala, Secretary of WUA 
Busupur. 
When looking at the IWM institution and today’s rules, GOK is putting a 
great deal of importance on the shift of responsibilities from state to 
collective WUA’s and the farmers. However, the attitudes among the 
farmers are not necessarily coherent with the laws and rules. The farmers 
are not yet aware, or convinced that a collective voice will give them 
benefits. This does not seem to be taken into consideration within today’s 
context.  
In the illustration beneath, I have gathered the function and goal of a water 
user association 
 
Figure 11. Source: Mai Simonsen (2008) 
                                              
25 Interview done 23.03.08 
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5.2.1 The conditions for setting up a WUA 
In Karnataka, the formation of WUA is done in accordance with the Karnataka 
Irrigation Act, 2000. In order to make the best utilization of available water, the 
GOK amended the Irrigation Act of 1965 in June 2000. The amendments 
emphasise that irrigation management responsibility can be given from the 
Irrigation Department (ID) to WUAs at primary, distributary, project, and State 
level. Prior to 2000, WUAs could only have responsibility of a minor or a part of 
a distributary.  
To register an association, the farmers have to collect a minimum of Rs.10, 000 
for shares and deposit it in the District Cooperative Bank (DCC). The initial 
contribution per farmer is Rs. 115 (share money- Rs. 100; share fee-Rs.5; entry 
fee-Rs.10). In the case of Scheduled Caste (SC)/Scheduled Tribes (ST) farmer26, 
government pays Rs.115 to enable them to become members of the society. The 
Board of Directors of WUA’s has to contain eight members of who three should 
be representative from tail end, SC/ST and a women’s category. CADA officials 
register the society once the money is deposited in the Bank. When these criteria 
are fulfilled, the Irrigation Department will enter into Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) regarding water management prior to the season.  
Although this initial process seems straightforward, it is difficult to get the WUA 
to function. There are 427 registered WUAs in the entire TBRP. Only 144 of the 
WUAs have signed a MOU, and according to STRIVER,27 there are only four 
functioning WUAs under the Tungabhadra CADA office. In D54, there was one 
semi - functioning WUA in head reach.  
                                              
26 The Scheduled Caste (SC) and the Scheduled Tribes (ST) are the lowest cast in the traditional Hindu ranking 
system. SC and ST used to have almost no rights, but today the Indian Constitution has outlawed any caste based 
discrimination. However, the Caste System is still very much alive in practice as the traditional perceptions and 
political relations are incorporated into the everyday lives of millions, especially in rural areas.   
27 Tungabhadra River Basin – An  Overview, ISEC, 2008:41 
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5.2.2 Current semi-functioning WUA in D54 
In D54, there was only one WUA in the head reach town Busupur. It was 
registered in August 2005 when 105 farmers paid the initial fee. However, it is 
still not operational, as the board have yet to sign the 'Memorandum of 
Understanding' with ID. The secretary Mr. Jabbala explains why this is the case: 
 “There are many rules which need to be followed. Due to lack of 
cooperation amongst the members, it hard to follow these rules, 
and this is used against us. The ID is not willing to give us the full 
responsibility just yet [i.e. a MOU]. This means that we cannot 
collect the tax nor can farmers see the visible results of being part 
of a WUA.” 28 
Here the farmer’s lack of cooperation can be seen to be the reason why the 
ID is not giving them the full responsibility. When I posed this question to 
a CADA officer, he told me  
“I go where societies are active. There I guide them. […]Where 
there is participation from the farmers, activities are possible to 
achieve. As it stands now I feel that WUAs are on paper – not in 
practice, as there is very little activity today.” 29 
If the farmers understand the various options they have, but do not take them, 
then it is legitimate that the CADA officer expresses such a statement. But the 
CADA officer must be present the inform and initiate the activity he himself is 
seeking. 
The procedure of setting up a WUA outlined above is meant to assure proper 
participation resulting in proper actions and outcomes. Mr Jabbala, the secretary 
describes the situation Busupur WUA is facing in detail:  
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“Firstly the ID has to give us the cusecs (cubic litres per second) 
for our particular minor and only when we have this information 
on paper – can both sides has accept the new power switch. When 
we are in charge of this – we can follow and monitor everything in 
the minor. Without this information it is very little we can do.”30   
The CADA officer, who made the comment about WUAs only functioning well 
on paper, is in my mind a classic example showing lack of genuine effort to want 
the WUA to operate properly. It takes little effort to point out that the situation is 
working on paper, but a lot of effort to make it work in reality. This is in fact the 
CADA officer’s job. To illustrate this point Mr Singh the president of the 
Busupur WUA, said:   
“Today the WUA has only had two meetings with our members, 
and it is always related to when a problem arises. Therefore, the 
members are not sure on how to use the association. But there is 
not much we can do about it, as we are not able to do more without 
the full consent from the CADA office.”31 
At present, few farmers can see how the WUA will benefit them. At the same 
time the IWM officials demands the farmer’s attention and wants insurance that 
they will collectively and actively, be part of the WUA. 
Nevertheless, the IWM institution above farmer’s level is not taking the status of 
the WUA seriously, meaning the WUA has very little empowerment. Mr Singh 
the president of the WUA explains: 
“In the future we can deal with the issues amongst ourselves and 
hire in external help if needed. Then it would be us in charge 
directly rather than the ID. We have sent ID a letter about our 
serious problems, but hard to use this WUA when we are lacking 
the last formal approval” 32 
Immediately after this statement from the president of the WUA, the secretary 
enthusiastically continued: 
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“If the farmers and the GOK are willing to cooperate amongst 
each other and with each other, then this WUA will work. This 
unfortunately is not the case today – but it can work in near future. 
We are only in the beginning of the process, and the change takes a 
lot of time to get used to.” 33  
Their belief in the WUA will probably with time lead to a well functioning 
organisation. However, none of the farmers interviewed were members in the 
current WUA and only six out of the nine farmers knew what a WUA was or had 
opinions on this matter. In tail end, it was an alien concept, as none of the three 
farmers I interviewed had heard of a WUA.  
5.2.3 Chicken and egg situation 
Mr. Arjun Sengupta in mid reach told that:  
“The reason for no WUA in this area is that there is no 
cooperation between the farmers. There should definitely be one 
[WUA], but there is no local will for it.”34 
The lack of cooperate among the farmers is a major issue and seems to be the 
toughest challenge for the farmers. The head reach farmers are enjoying and 
profiting with their situation. The idea of giving up some of their advantages, in 
order to ensure benefits for the farmers downstream is small, as there are no 
current incentives. The head reach farmers are rational beings per definition. In 
the head reach, Mr Avinandan Singh explains: “We did try to form a WUA, but 
because of lack of corporation between the head and tail, we discontinued” 35 
Realizing that there ultimately is a chicken and egg situation present, how and 
who will have to take the first initiative? The farmers are waiting for action from 
the Irrigation Water Management institution. The IWM institution is awaiting 
action from the farmers. The present initiative of a WUA is a top down approach, 
which GOK is obliged to enforce by law. However, reality shows the practice of 
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this enforcement lies in the willingness among the officials and farmers to 
cooperate and to participate.  
Hence, the current situation is not ideal. Mr. Arjun Sengupta explained how the 
farmers in mid reach are currently dealing with their situation: 
“When we are facing problems, we firstly go to the Irrigation 
Department. Here we speak to the Executive Engineer and we try 
to get them to interact with the other institutions in order to better 
our situation. If this does not result in anything, we secondly go to 
the MP’s [Members of Parliament]. We talk to these people and 
explain the situation. If this does not work either, our third option 
is to sneak out at night and divert the water to our field by placing 
lots of stones in the main canal. It s the only way we can solve the 
immediate crisis we are facing. […] We have to take the matter 
into our own hands” 36 
This shows how the farmers themselves have ways of dealing with their own 
issues. Due to lack of efficient ways of channelling their issues, their need to be 
heard has turned into short time solutions, which again has consequences for the 
farmers further along the minor. This implies that if the official IWM institution 
is functioning, but the farmers lack a receptive institution, the result is violating 
actions. A receptive facility with the ability to communicate, would probably 
lead to more sustainable solutions. 
5.2.4  No information about collective benefits of a WUA 
Although GOK has tried to make considerable progress in the formation of 
WUAs in TBRP and other projects, D54 has a long road ahead.  
The direct incentive of 40% income from the irrigation water fee collection will 
sustain WUA’s activity, have benefits for the individual farmer, as well as 
operate and maintain the local infrastructure. The president and the secretary of 
the WUA in Busupur were both convinced that if they collected the fees rather 
than the RD, the utilization of water would be much better. They also said that 
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this act alone would show the farmers that they are in control and can influence 
their livelihood more directly, by being a member.  
There seems to be more benefits that the farmers could achieve by being part of a 
WUA, than not. The most important point would be a more equitable water 
distribution among farmers. Probably also a more reliable water supply as the 
water supply becomes more responsive to the local crop needs. The WUA would 
be able to monitor the current crop need much closer than the few officials do 
today. The association would also be an arena to deal with the occurring disputes 
at the local level. Eventually it could result in a better-maintained distributary 
with less water theft, stealing and free riding. 
However, none of these benefits were mentioned, talked about, or found 
anywhere. On the contrary, the focus was on the lack of willingness to cooperate 
amongst the farmers. This focus makes it difficult to sustain a positive attitude. 
5.2.5 The tail enders are loosing  
Mr. Santosh Naik in the tail end said:   
“I am not aware of what a WUA is. I don’t think the head of this 
village knows what that is. [After explaining the concept of a WUA 
to Mr. Naik he continued] If we had a WUA all our problems 
would be solved. However, no one knows about this. Today when 
we have a problem, we approach the ID as a group and tell about 
the lack of water. This normally results in one day extra with 
water.” 37 
This statement reveals the level of impact the actual farmers in tail end are 
achieving today. All the interviewed farmers are dealing with their immediate 
needs in an acute manner, rather than focusing on sustainable long-term 
solutions. This short-term thinking reveals the need for a WUA.  
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Another farmer in the tail end, Mr. Rajeev Khan, asked, “What is WUA?” The 
fact that the farmers downstream are lacking knowledge of what a WUA is 
shows the need for more information. The issues are greater downstream tail end 
and therefore the need is stronger for a collective voice. It also shows how the 
rest of the IWM institution is failing to incorporate the farmers, in all reaches and 
especially those who need it most.  
To this point Mr. Santosh Naik in tail end explains:  
“We have gone and approached the head reach farmers as a 
group, but nothing happened. There is no interest from the 
official’s side, so hard for us to have a say in anything to do with 
the management of irrigation water. If the farmers in head reach 
grew 5 acres with rice and 5 acres with a less water intensive crop, 
there would be more water for us. But they grow 10 acres of 
paddy.” 38 
The most important issue for the people in the downstream of the distributary is 
that the water comes that far. Although they demand water by visiting the CADA 
offices, when it reaches a critical point, there seems to be a lack of knowledge 
and sustainable long-term solutions from the officials. Perhaps the farmers feel 
like beneficiaries of the system rather than an impacting part. The lack of 
cooperation between the farmers themselves results in clusters of individual 
farmers gathering when needed (in a crisis), rather than functioning as a more 
viable farmer group.  
Robert Thörlind (2000) explains that traditional informal networks at village 
level often are clientelistic, but the clients themselves do not find the situation 
oppressive. (Ibid: 17) The fact that the there is a vertical trust between the patron 
(for example the head of the village) and the client (the farmer) and that the 
farmer actually prefers the head of the village to be involved rather than himself, 
is in my mind a very interesting aspect of participation. The empowerment of the 
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farmers can often function better in a situation where the head of the village is in 
control, rather than each individual farmer is forced to participate.  
5.3 Concluding remarks 
When Mr. Krishna Babu from the mid reach explains what he does to resolve his 
current water shortage he answered:  
“I go with the leaders of the village, and we speak to the authority. 
This often resolves my water shortage.” 39 
This has resulted in an extra day with water at the most - but not any long-term 
solution to the problem. However, this type of statement shows that the thought 
of a collective voice is stronger than the individual voice. Thus, the idea of a 
more permanent organisation like a WUA, should, if the IWM institution really 
wanted to – be possible to implement. The comments from the official side 
stating that WUAs are currently only working on paper, and that there is a need 
for willingness amongst the farmers to be active – shows a hesitant attitude to an 
effective long lasting organisation. The reason for this hesitance could be related 
to the fact that a WUA would generate a lot of extra work for the current 
officials, and it would mean more involvement on a regular basis with the 
farmers. In the long run, however, a proper working WUA would take current 
problems with infrastructure and farmers into their own hands, freeing the 
officials from this work.  
A current dilemma in D54 is related to the farmers who see an operative WUA as 
an unrealistic alternative. It is clear that the individual benefits (for some) are 
greater than the benefits the farmers will gain from a collective WUA. The fact 
that there is no properly working WUA is making it hard to convince farmers 
that this is the way forward. Nevertheless, based on what the farmers have 
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revealed, there are several other important reasons why the WUA is not 
functioning. 
Firstly, it takes time to set up WUA – as the willingness amongst all parts of the 
IWM institution needs to support and nurture the concept of WUA. Secondly, the 
fact that the farmers are not cooperating makes it hard to enforce a WUA. 
However, the lack of interest relates to misconception, or lack of information of 
how a WUA can improve the current situation. Thirdly, the two sub divisional 
offices present in D54, (one in charge of head reach and the other in charge of 
mid and tail end); have to show a greater willingness to want the WUA to be the 
tool for a better management process. Due to the shortage of staff, it has failed to 
improve public participation in the IWM process. A good start would be to invest 
in more staff from the officials’ side, to cover an area of 43 km. Their ultimate 
goal should be to have more than a semi-functioning WUA in the head reach of 
D54. If this were accomplished then hopefully the WUA would act as the 
monitoring instance lacking in today’s IWM institution. 
The current horizontal institutional structure (see the map on page) is not 
functioning well. Although all the laws are written, it lacks the ability to perform 
in practice. Hence, the decentralization of power has not been transferred 
successfully in D54. This has resulted in farmer’s moving to a third option of 
individual self-help – and a legitimization of more desperate actions dealing with 
the current issues. Together with the institutional structure of WUAs, there is a 
need for a supportive state agency and policies, a combination of appropriate 
technology/economic forces including clear property rights and profitability of 
irrigation enterprises. This is in my mind what is required for achieving a 
sustainable WUA, as well a sustainable irrigation system.  
The next chapter will reveal the farmers’ thoughts on individual participation 
situations, payment for irrigation water and choice of crop. In these situations, 
the IWM institution is working better.  
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6. Individual action - collective consequences 
This chapter addresses how the following two individual actions, payment for 
irrigation water and choice of crop, can portray the role of the farmer in the IWM 
process. In doing so, it situates the farmers within the current hierarchy of the 
IWM institution. By asking the farmers the reason for their actions, we determine 
if the somewhat individual actions are done with the collective in mind, or 
whether the action is solely concerned with individual benefits.  
In the first section of this chapter, I look at how payment for irrigation water 
directly includes the farmer as part of the IWM institution. The individual act of 
paying is seen as a contractual agreement, as outlined in the initial hypothesis the 
individual act of paying for water is done with the intention of participating in 
the IWM institution, more than paying for the water as such. The statistics in 
chapter three clearly revealed that 87% of the responding farmers paid their 
water fees. However, it was not evident why they paid or what the intention 
behind this action was.  
 
The second part of this chapter is concerned with the individual act of choosing 
which crop to grow. Each year, the IWM institution “provides” guidelines called 
cropping designs, an optimal guide advising what to grow in a specific area, 
based on soil conditions and water availability. The farmers are obliged to follow 
these guides. However, the final hypothesis that the individual choice of crop has 
consequences for the farmers collectively in each area, and should therefore be a 
matter of a collective organisation, will be argued in comparison what influences 
the farmer’s choice. 
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6.1 Why pay for irrigation water? 
When I asked the farmers why the farmers are paying, many answers varied 
according to their location along the stretch. In head reach, Mr. Pradip Yani 
answered:  “Since I am using water I will pay the tax.”40 Although most of the 
reasons the farmers gave me were diverse, six of the nine farmers said that they 
paid the tax because they received water. These farmers were located along the 
length of the distributary in head, middle, and tail. The farmers only referred to 
paying for water, not the maintenance of the water system. 
To go back to the initial process: When the building of the water infrastructure in 
India was debated, everyone had opinions on the management- and pricing issue. 
Molle and Berkoff (2006) note:  
The questions of who was to finance the infrastructure (local 
revenue, the Crown, or private interests), whether and how a water 
fee should be levied, what its impact on different categories of 
people would be, whether it should be increased, whether it could 
influence crop choice or water use behaviour, to cite a few 
examples, were fiercely debated. Opinions diverged between the 
British Government, the Government of India and other colonial 
authorities, local governments, canal engineers, etc. and 
alternatives such as private investments, bulk volumetric pricing, 
and crop-based differential rates were all tested 
 (Bolding et al. 1995, in Molle and Berkoff, 2006)  
None of the interviewees mentioned operation and maintenance (O&M) costs as 
a reason for paying the fees. On the contrary, when I asked Mr. Sardep Meda in 
head reach if he thought paying the fees resulted in better management, his 
answer was: “I have not noticed any changes in better management, but I still pay 
the tax.” This again makes it hard to justify the claim that when you are paying 
for your water, you are paying for the O&M, which in theory should result in 
better management and fewer disputes.  
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Perhaps the confusion has to do with the current tariff system, where the crop 
type and area of land are the indicators of the amount to be paid, rather than the 
type/size of the irrigation system needing O & M.  
If the connection between the water fees and O&M was more apparent, it would 
be easier for a WUA to explain this benefit to it farmers. This due to 1) if the 
WUA was a functioning institution, then it is indeed the WUA who would collect 
the water fees (as opposed to the irrigation department) in its own area and 2) the 
40% of fees which is retained within the WUA, could then be used in a way 
necessary to benefit that specific minor or distributary.  
The lack of connection between these two relevant issues, make it hard to see 
why paying fees can have a collective impact – not just a rational effect. The 
farmers might feel more obliged to pay on a regular basis if other locals collected 
the fees and direct results could be seen by paying for better operation and 
maintenance.  
“I pay the tax. If I don’t pay, the amount increases.”41 Mr. Santosh Naik in tail 
end was extremely keen to the point out which rates were for which particular 
crop. He knew all the different rates. Those in the tail end with less land knew on 
the dot the current rates per acre for the various different light crops. However, 
there have been incidences of farmers in the head reach who could not tell 
exactly how much they pay for water, as they receive plenty for their large fields.  
Mr. Arjun Sengupta in mid reach had a more rational answer where he initially 
revealed that:  
“The reason for why I paid my water tax in 2000 to was that I 
applied for a loan that year. You then need a receipt from the 
government to show that you are a paying farmer, only then will 
you receive the loan in the bank.” 42 
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The fact that the last time Mr. Sengupta had paid his fees was in 2000, shows that 
there are irregularities in the current payment system. The statistics revealed by 
the STRIVER data were thought to be unrealistic by the STRIVER team.43 
Several suggested that the farmers felt that they needed to state that they have 
just paid the fees, in case we were working for the government. Another farmer 
in mid reach, Mr. Vinay Kumar said that, “the only reason for why I paid my tax, 
was to get a loan.” 44 
To have such a strong incentive related to the act of payment for irrigation water, 
does not in my mind act in favour of regular payments. Hence, the farmers pay 
when they need a loan, rather than when the fees are due.  
6.2 Collective consequences related to the non-payment of 
fees 
I mentioned the fact that the individual farmer as a rational being could in many 
ways act upon what will in the long run benefit them most. The collective 
consequences of non-payment however relates to the fact that the farmers are 
breaking the rules if they use irrigation water. So-called free riding where 
farmers are using water but not paying, means that the farmers who are paying 
will not receive their intended amount.  
6.2.1 Free riding 
Free riders are the farmers who are withdrawing water without paying or 
contributing to the local community – just enjoying the ride free of cost. Free 
riding is also referred to as illegal withdrawals, and it was visible in many parts 
of D54. Some of the farmers in both mid and tail end justify this action, although 
there seemed to be many hard-hitting normative sanctions by the other farmers 
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against those who perform illegal withdrawals on regular bases. Mr. Singh in mid 
reach claimed:  
“Free riders could only be dealt with by the other farmers 
surrounding the violator, as he then has to deal with the shame 
every day. […] When the government is the instance in charge, the 
illegal pump set would often be removed by night, but no fine or 
any other sanctions would take place. This would often be repeated 
several times. If the farmers themselves deal with the problem, the 
violator would be shamed as well as understanding that his actions 
have consequences”45 
Mr. Sardep Meda in head reach said that he did not dare to do anything as an 
individual, but would rather organize a group who can tackle the violator 
together. “People are withdrawing water illegally – but we cannot abolish this 
problem. We cannot do anything, so we just leave it”  
In the mid reach Mr. Krishna Babu voiced, 
“We can’t do anything, I know that one or two farmers are 
definitely withdrawing water illegally with pump sets. This results 
in us receiving 30% less water, but there is still nothing we can do. 
There are no group actions, we just keep quiet. If we raise our 
voices towards the other farmers, the farmers withdrawing the 
water illegally would say: You should be able to distribute the 
available water amongst yourself – you can increase your land and 
then you expect everything to work out anyway?” 46  
This farmer had put the guilt back on Mr. Babu. He did not enjoy the encounter 
at all. This strengthens the need for a better IWM monitoring instance. The 
farmers feel that it is outside their hands – and it is by law the IWM officials’ job 
to enforce the sanctions when no WUA is present, as it directly jeopardizes the 
water availability for the farmers further down the minor.   
There was also a comment made by a tail ender saying there are no illegal 
withdrawals in this area, “as there is no water there in the first place.” When 
being interrogated further, he explained that although there are no illegal 
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withdrawals, some of the farmers would go further up the distributary or minor 
during night and put big rocks to stop the natural water flow, which channelled 
more water into their fields instead. There were also farmers who during daytime 
let their herd of buffalos rest in the channels. The bathing herd would increase 
the water level drastically, meaning it would flow into their field channels. This 
shows how the farmers take the matter into their own hands, and use the tools 
and knowledge they have, in order to deal with the scarcity problem.  
6.2.2 The lack of monitoring 
Mr. Sengupta in mid reach explained that the officials were not counted on to 
solve the matter of free riding: 
“The engineers and officials are aware of the illegal withdrawals, 
but if they try to do anything about it, all the farmers in the 
neighbourhood become angry. They therefore do nothing. These 
people withdrawing water illegally are resulting in 25% less water 
for me. It is not fair, but it is reality”47  
Mr. Sengupta felt that the officials where not to trust on handling the free riders. 
Mr. Sengupta also said he paid the water fees in 2000 to apply for a loan. When I 
asked if the revenue collector had come in more recent years, Mr Sengupta 
answered: “If the revenue collector comes now, the farmers will beat him, so he 
is not coming to them, but rather waiting for us to come to him when we have the 
money.” This was not an easy answer to follow up - but my initial thought was, 
who the controlling party is in this case? Although the IWM institution is a top-
down hierarchal structure, this shows that in practice the numbers of farmers are 
a bigger threat to the officials than the numbers of staff working on monitoring, 
and the fine or other punishments are not a big enough threat, resulting in 
farmers choosing not to pay for their water.  
It also reflects that the officials lack respect and stature amongst the farmers who 
are in some cases taking the law into their own hands. The laws and regulations 
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currently in place in D54 are obviously not followed in practice. The interesting 
part about this situation is that the farmers are in on this together, as they have 
understood that the collective force is greater than the individual member of the 
revenue department. In fact, this is the farmers’ collective ace up their sleeve.  
In theory, this old way to fight for your rights should not be necessary in a 
country that has so many rules in place. This type of impact on the management 
of irrigation water is beyond the powers of simplicity. In fact, it does in my mind 
show an attitude that was born in desperation and has become accepted. This was 
related from the middle reach but the same attitude was also visible in the tail end 
of D54. Another farmer from further down the reach also explained what he 
would do if someone from the ID tried to punish him because he has not paid his 
fees - he too would raise his fists. 
Corruption was evident when the topic of monitoring (or lack of it), was 
discussed in two of my interviews. Mr. Sengupta in mid reach made me aware 
the following, which according to him, happens all the time:  
“I pay the collector 2000 rupees, but the receipt says 1500 rupees. 
Once I asked why that was the case, so I received a penalty of  
10 000 rupees. I just pay and accept the receipt these days”48  
Not many others were claiming this type of interaction with the RD. Fellow 
STRIVER members told me that this was something the farmer must have made 
up. I am allowing this statement to come forward as it shows the easiness of 
corruption – and indicates that there is not enough monitoring within the official 
offices. In fact, it probably benefits the officials dramatically to be corrupt – as 
their pay is not very high. This shows how control quickly changes between the 
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farmer and the official. This has become the revenue collectors’ ace up the 
sleeve. 
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6.3 Why follow the cropping designs? 
The choice of crop is essential in understanding the physical impacts the farmers 
have within the IWM process and system. Over the years, the violation and 
unauthorised irrigation in the head reach has caused deprivation on a large scale 
in the tail end. There is an increasing trend in paddy cultivation, in areas where 
other crops are more suitable for the conditions. If this trend continues, it can 
result in a concentration of water in only a few distributaries and minors, causing 
a greater amount of deprivation for the tail enders (Tail-enders and Other 
Deprived in the Canal Water Distribution, GOI, 2003:18).  
An official in the ID explained:  
“Due to introduction of paddy, the soil has adjusted to this crop. 
You cannot grow anything else, as the soil will not manage. The 
conditions for growing rice are not suitable for any other crop.”49  
This has proven to be a repeated fact amongst the farmers. However, in the other 
distributary visited in Bhadravati, D22, the farmers had collectively agreed on 
growing a different crop, the much less water intensive arecanut. Although the 
first six years had been tough, the situation in all three reaches today was    
According to a study done by GOI on Tail-enders and Other Deprived in the 
Canal Water Distribution (2003), there is overall 50% deprivation of irrigation 
water in D54 and the main reason relates to cropping violations in the head 
reach. The observations in the study encountered that farmers in the head reach 
cut the canal banks even on the other side of the command area, filled the water 
into an open well, and with the help of pumps irrigated their own lands. 
Although the departments are aware of this, the departments seem to be unable to 
control these farmers. The proposed reason I was given related to the fact that 
head reach farmers are socially, economically, and politically influential farmers.  
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6.3.1 Water scarcity, a direct result of cropping violation 
The Cropping Design proposed by the CADA office in Munirabad had the some 
alarming figures in their annual report 2005-2006 related to the Raichur District:  
 
Figure 12. Source : CADA, Tungabhadra rapport, Annual Report 2005-2006, p.23 
The table above shows that in Kharif season, the ACHIEVEMENT in the AREA 
SOWN exceeds the TARGET on almost all crops. It also shows that the cropping 
violations are mainly happening with water-intensive crops like paddy (rice), 
jowar, maize, and bajra. Whilst the oil seeds – which are less water-intensive – 
are under either, target or just above it. As I pointed out in chapter three, 95.8% 
of the farmers in head reach grows paddy in both Kharif and Rabi season, 
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referred to as double cropping. This means that 95.8% of the head reach farmers 
are currently violating the indented CD. 
Interestingly, the CADA design in Rabi season has specifically refrained from 
including the water intensive paddy cultivation, as there is much less water 
available in this season. However, as this illustration shows, the design is not 
followed.  
 
Figure 13. Source : CADA, Tungabhadra rapport, Annual Report 2005-2006, p.24 
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This proves that there is very little monitoring or incentives to follow the initial 
design. Unfortunately, it seems to be a reoccurring trend, making it harder to 
return to other crops.  
When investigating how the scarcity scenario is escalating, I found that the main 
problem lies in a violation of the cropping patterns. There is a good 
understanding among the farmers for the difference between water-intensive 
crops and less water-intensive crops. This means that there is a clear 
understanding of the amount of water needed to grow specific crops. It is not, in 
other words, done in an oblivious state of mind. On the contrary, the farmers 
choose to grow the crop that gives most profit per acre, and give little priority to 
the consequences for the distributary as a whole.  
The original designs for cropping patterns in this area are not followed, although 
they are meant to be optimal for the particular command area. Therefore, three 
possible scarcity scenarios arise – all of which add up to the emerging water 
crisis that the farmers are experiencing. The first became evident when Mr. 
Krishna Babu in mid reach told me the following:  
“I grow jowar and cotton, as I follow the water availability in this 
minor. I cannot grow paddy because of lack of water. If I were to 
change to for example sunflower or areca nut the soil is not 
sufficient, lacking the minerals, and quality to grow such crops. 
The best option for this soil and water availability is cotton.” 50 
This shows that the current farmers take into consideration the surroundings and 
the natural conditions when they decide on their crop. If nevertheless, the farmers 
choose to grow a different crop, which gives more personal profit, then the 
scarcity issue is the farmer’s own fault. This scenario – self-inflicted water 
scarcity due to choice of crop – is definitely a visible self-made deprivation in 
D54. Although ID has “provided”51 the cropping Design (CD) regarding the 
availability of water and the crops to be grown, this cropping design is not 
                                              
50 Interview done 22.03.08 
51 I put it brackets as the situation is that this CD has not been seen by any farmer 
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followed. Farmers take a chance and grow paddy in Rabi crop and as the table on 
above shows, paddy is not advised in Rabi season. Paddy is none the less grown 
on a large scale.  
The paddy cultivation trend is affecting those who are further down the stretch, 
resulting in very few possibilities for the mid and tail end farmers to improve 
their conditions. Mr. Santosh Naik in the tail end explains:  
“If the farmers in head reach grew 5 acres with rice and 5 acres 
with a less water intensive crop, there would be more water for us. 
But they grow 10 acres of paddy.”52 
Thus the second scenario is - scarcity due to others’ crop violation - a situation 
the individual farmer cannot be in control of. This issue, due to others’ choices of 
crop and crop violations, results in huge consequences for fellow farmers.  
The third scenario relates to the farmers’ physical location in D54. The chance of 
receiving the intended water in the tail end is less likely in comparison with a 
head reach farmer. The two other scenarios influence this scenario, as the water 
scarcity relates to its location. The scarcity issue is due to the natural location of 
your farm. The Water Resource Department (WRD) is in theory accountable for 
this situation, as the farmers in tail end should receive water independently of the 
location. However, the releasing of water due to canal dams, cropping violations, 
and illegal withdrawals is resulting in an uneven allocation along the distributary.  
As the first scenario outlines, the choice of crop is having a direct physical 
impact of IWM. However, it is not so easily justified. 
6.4 Collective consequences related to cropping pattern 
violations 
During a meeting with several CADA officials, it was said: “The farmers in this 
area are aware of the design, but it is not followed. Paddy is the main crop along 
 85
the entire stretch.” The initial design during Kharif season was coconut, Mango 
and Sugarcane, and in Rabi season, low water intensive crops (see list above). 
When I asked the CADA officials why they thought the cropping patterns are not 
followed, they claimed that low water-intensive crops require a lot of labour and 
have a low market price. One of my own observations in the field was that paddy 
was the best option for the farmers in head reach, due to excessive water 
availability, low labour-intensity and a steady market price. Mr. Pradip Yani in 
head reach expressed: “No one insisted on me growing paddy. If I don’t grow 
paddy I will lose money”53  
6.4.1 Rational farmers 
It is relevant to look at the farmers as rational beings in this context. The farmer 
will choose a crop, which a) will give him the most profit and b) is less labour-
intensive. However, when I asked the farmers what influenced their choice of 
crop, many other aspects were revealed. Mr. Krishna Babu in the mid reach 
explained to me that this knowledge is passed down through tradition:  
“I have not seen any cropping design, but I believe that such 
designs would not be helpful. I just follow the tradition. Since other 
farmers are growing paddy, I am growing paddy too. I cannot 
grow anything else” 54 
When I asked if he had seen the cropping design, he told me that he had never 
seen it:  
“I have not seen any cropping design, but it would be interesting to 
see it. Maybe if such a design was followed it would mean better 
water availability along the entire distributary”55 
 
 
52 Interview done 21.03.08  
53 Interview done 20.03.08 
54 Interview done 20.03.08 
55 Interview done 20.03.08 
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In head reach, I got the same answers from Mr.Pradip Yani: “I have not seen the 
guidelines,”56 and in the tail end Mr. Avin Vinjay looked puzzled when we asked 
if he had seen the CD. In fact, none of the nine farmers I interviewed had seen 
CD guidelines. This was contradictory to what the CADA officer had told us.  
Despite not having seen the CD, Mr. Avinandan Singh in head reach explained 
that some of the other farmers had received advice from the agricultural 
department on what to grow in this particular area.  
“Other farmers have tried to grow other yields than paddy, based 
on the advice they were given, but they did not succeed. They then 
shifted back to paddy due to the soil condition and failure in 
yield”57 
Mr. Arjun Sengupta in mid reach also told me about a similar situation:  
“I have not seen any cropping design, but last year we had a visit 
from the officials who gave the village advice on what was good to 
grow in this area. There were farmers who followed these advices, 
but unfortunately, they lost their crops. So now we grow the one 
crop [cotton] which is less water intense and we know for sure will 
pay off.”  
Unfortunately, the advice from the CD, or help from the IWW institution, has for 
some of the farmers failed miserably. The job the IWM officials have done in 
conjunction with providing viable suggestions have so far had very unreliable 
results. The farmers are wary to trust this advice, which is not always in line with 
the current soil and irrigation water scenario for D54.  
One of the CADA officers told me that he was a farmer himself with land in head 
reach – and consequently he got the inevitable question of what he was growing. 
“Paddy58, of course,” he answered with a smile.  
                                              
56 Interview done 20.03.08 
57 Interview done 20.03.08 
58 Rice 
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6.5 Concluding remarks 
The two actions payment for water and choice of crop are currently signs of a 
rational farmer, whose intention is to maximise and achieve his own benefits and 
profits.  
Although the STRIVER data shows a high percentage of paying, and many of 
the interviewees said they paid for the water rather than O&M, some farmers 
acknowledge that there are other reasons behind paying, such as getting a bank 
loan. The data does not show regularity of payment, i.e. if the farmers are paying 
the fee each year, but rather confirms that the farmers have paid. The fact that 
someone in tail end answered he paid the fee in 1975 confirms why it is 
important to have this in mind. However, the individual need for a loan 
stimulates to instant participation, as this incentive has a strong direct benefit to 
the farmer. In my interviews, two of nine said that this was the reason behind 
their last payment. Hence, my hypothesis that the individual act of paying for 
water is done with the intention of participating in the IWM institution, more 
than paying for the water as such, is not confirmed. However, the social stigma 
related to free riders, show that the farmers are interested in participating and 
being part of the institution. Nevertheless, as this interest arises from the negative 
consequences free riding has for the farmer’s own water availability, then the 
action is solely concerned with individual benefits and deprived of a broader 
collective attitude. 
The individual act of choosing which crop to grow is not in anyway related to the 
IWM institutions cropping design, as the CD is not commonly distributed among 
the farmers. The action of cropping violations has serious consequences for 
fellow farmers, as the equal distribution of water from the IWM institutions side 
becomes irrelevant. Hence, the hypothesis that the individual choice of crop has 
consequences for the farmers collectively in each area, and should therefore be a 
matter of a collective organisation, becomes a priority of the IWM institution. 
The current lack of institutional presence, either as a monitoring instance of 
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cropping violations or double cropping (in both seasons), or even as an advisory 
body with agricultural advices and guidelines, is a making all the farmers losers, 
with tail end farmers the worse off. The law is clear about the responsibility local 
authorities have, but this is not being enforced. The farmers can therefore not be 
held responsible, as the conditions, traditions and current knowledge can be seen 
because of a weak IWM institution – with too few staff to follow up on 
violations or ensure the ‘right’ crops are in place.  
 
Nevertheless, this weakness has been used as one of the main reasons for 
promoting WUAs. The more responsibility taken at farmer level, should in 
theory function better and enforce a more sustainable resource distribution. In my 
mind, I found it questionable to expect this of a WUA, as the traditions in 
farming are clearly based on individual rational choices, rather than on collective 
actions with collective benefits. As it stands, the option is either to strengthen 
various levels and departments within current IWM institution, where the farmers 
are beneficiaries of a working irrigations system, or actively promote and spread 
the benefits of collective participation and empowerment.  
 
I will continue this line of thought in the next chapter, by looking at why the 
situation is at a stand still today. A summary of the findings from the three 
hypotheses outline in this chapter and the previous one, with the intention of 
considering what the farmers think is the way forward.  
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7. Why the current scenario is not progressing 
This chapter will look at why the current situation in D54 is not progressing, 
based on information from my interviews with the farmers. 
There are several comments from the farmers and from the officials underlining 
that the current form of the IWM institution is failing from both sides. The 
farmers have expressed that they know little about water user associations 
(WUAs) and its possible benefits. Therefore, collective participation through a 
WUA at present is not realistic, due to the lack of basic information from the 
IWM institution.  
Many farmers withdrawing water violate the system by not paying water fees, 
which in turn has immense consequences for those farmers who are paying 
further down the stretch. Some farmers asked for an enforcing institution to 
monitor and deal with illegal water withdrawals and free riding among other 
farmers. Some farmers expressed that they can deal with this themselves, while 
others expected this to be done by the IWM institution. The farmers, through 
their action of paying or not paying for water take a deliberate stand to whether 
they are a part of the collective institution or not. Nevertheless, based on my 
information there is no clear majority in favour of one or the other direction. 
This status quo situation in D54 can also be seen when judging the current 
provision of the cropping design (CD), which is unknown to many of the 
farmers. This tool indicates the success of the current IWM institution, as it 
reveals how communication functions down the different organisational levels 
within the IWM institution. However, as the officials kept commenting – no one 
follows the optimal guide and when the farmers have, the crops have failed.  
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7.1.1 No information  leads to a slow progress with WUAs  
The most common answer from 68% of the respondents in the household survey 
(HHS) was that they did not know what a Water User Association was. In tail 
end, not all three interviewed farmers had ever heard of it. Benefits of collective 
participation through a WUA was a completely alien concept, therefore progress 
in this area relies on information and a willingness from the IWM institutions to 
want to include the tail end in such development.  
Nevertheless, the focus of a collective spirit arises among the farmers when 
‘fighting’ for short-term solutions such as immediate release of more water, 
broken infrastructure, “threats” from the authorities or disputes between 
themselves. The farmers used the term ‘we and us’ frequently throughout the 
interviews. Although the formalization of collective action (Olson, 1965) and 
WUAs are promoted by GOK as the way forward to ensure the farmers the right 
to collective participation, the understanding of this is not rooted in minds of the 
farmers in D54.  
Lack of cooperation due to few known collective benefits 
The farmers who knew about WUAs stated repeatedly that the reason for no 
WUA activity in their villages was due to the farmers’ lack of ability to 
cooperate amongst themselves and the different reaches. The ‘classic’ issue 
between head reach and tail end, where the head reach farmers would have to 
give up some of their irrigation water, so that it could benefit the tail enders, is 
logically not a popular choice in head reach. This alone makes it hard to achieve 
progress, as the three reaches within the minor must cooperate to better the 
situation, also those that already are enjoying the benefits of plentiful water. 
However, are the benefits for the head reach farmers acceptable in today’s 
proposed WUA? The tail enders are the losers of today’s situation – will this 
change so the head reach farmers are the losers if WUAs are established? By 
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reflecting on what the farmers have answered, many have this way of 
comprehending the situation.  
The board members of the current WUA did not mention the benefits of 
collective participation. They too lacked focus on the positive outcomes of a 
functioning WUA. They mention responsibility for the maintenance of the 
infrastructure, the local decisions regarding the infrastructure and the 
responsibility of collecting water fees, all administrative tasks, but little to do 
with the farmers. 
The 40% of the water fees managed by the WUA might not directly relate to the 
farmers either, but would indirectly create a more effective system, as the 
available money would make it easier to hire external help to maintain the water 
supply – fixing the broken infrastructure means more water to each of the 
farmers’ fields. However, the WUA can also choose to use this money on the 
training of farmers in agricultural issues with help from WALMI. These farmers 
in turn can give advice to others and benefit the crop situation in the local minor. 
The WUA currently present in head reach encountered the interest to cooperate 
as the most difficult obstacle. The president, director, and secretary agreed that 
the hardest part was to make the head reach farmers understand that there are 
benefits exceeding that of giving up some of their irrigation water. After the 
association was formed and the membership fee paid, the farmers lost interested 
in participation as there were no benefits, and four years later, there are still no 
big differences. Ironically, as the WUA has not been given the full official 
consent, progress is even harder to achieve. 
No mention of benefits in a sustainable irrigation system 
Frustration over the lack of cooperation between the farmers was at the 
foreground of the interview with the WUAs board members. However, the 
illustration below shows an additional list of functions, not just the technical and 
economical functions mentioned by the present members of the WUA.   
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       Figure 14. Source: Mai Simonsen (2008) 
The result of these functions is a sustainable irrigation system. Hence, there is 
great importance of balancing the functions – social, economical, technical, and 
political - to make the farmers aware of all of these benefits.  
7.1.2 Payment for irrigation water – lack of proper monitoring 
What are they paying for 
At present, most of the farmers think the water fees are payment for the actual 
water. That the money is intended to cover operation and maintenance (O&M) 
fees is not reaching the farmer. When asked if they have seen a difference in the 
irrigation system – there was no immediate link between those two points. If this 
were clearer, then perhaps the idea of a WUA where 40% of the water fees go 
directly to the villages along the minor would be easier to communicate and act 
as a strong collective incentive for the WUA. A well functioning and maintained 
minor would benefit everyone, no matter location. Today’s situation, where the 
farmers point out how the canals keep degrading, shows that the maintenance 
work done by the ID, is short term and is not sustainable. This could be because 
the current water fees are extremely low. The low fee was intended to make sure 
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that all farmers had the ability to pay. As a result, there is not enough money to 
cover the O&M costs, which again leads to a degrading system. In addition to 
this, there are still many farmers who are not paying their fees. 
This may also be seen as one reason why the IWM institution is promoting the 
WUA. Not only will it mean less work for the officials and less responsibility for 
the reoccurring degradation of minors and smaller distributaries, but the Water 
User Association will with a local board collect the fees from farmers, and in 
doing so identify the those who do not pay. Hence, the likelihood of more 
farmers paying their fees and the sum of money available for maintenance will 
increase benefiting all the members. The collective spirit surfaced when the 
interviewees talked about free riding. The act of stealing water has direct 
consequences for farmers further down the minor – as it means less water for 
those farmers who pay. Such an action would be harder for a single farmer when 
the rest of the village is in the WUA. Similarly, the collective spirit was very 
much alive when the authorities (revenue collector) tried to claim payments. 
Unfortunately, the use of violence was seen as a way for the farmers to stand 
together against the authority. The idea of collective participation with collective 
benefits would be easier when the reason for paying is clear and the money will 
be used for a sustainable irrigation system.  
7.1.3 Hard to achieve progress when the cropping design is unknown 
The current scenario where either farmers are violating by double cropping, or 
not growing according to the cropping designs, shows that the individual benefits 
hidden within these individual actions, are “more profitable” alternatives than 
those laid out by the cropping design (CD). The sanctions and rules laid down by 
GOK and the IWM institution are not strong enough to hindering these 
violations, therefore they continue.  
However, as the nine interviewees had never seen the CD, the point of such a 
tool is useless to the farmers. If the intention of the CD is to help the farmers then 
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action is needed to make the CD known. This can be seen as a failing of the 
IWM institution as this essential information can better the livelihoods of the 
farmers. But the cropping design information as it stands today is not realistic – 
either due to the lack of professional technical insight on quality of land in 
relation to availability of water or to do with laziness. The fact that the CD is not 
followed is a known fact among all the official bodies, but still the IWM 
institution is promoting it. Advice and information provided by several 
departments within the IWM institution has had fatal consequences and has not 
helped to achieve a trustful relationship between the institution and the farmers. 
The CD was intended to ensure a sustainable irrigation system, a very much-
needed tool, but this is not available today. 
7.2 The way forward according to the farmer 
The idea of collective participation was mentioned as a way forward by several 
of the farmers after it was explain what a WUA was. Mr Krishna Babu in mid 
reach explicitly expressed that if a WUA had been present it would have been 
easier to deal with free riders: 
“If we had a WUA, they as a group could take over this situation 
[illegal withdrawals], but as here is no union, it is hard for me as 
one farmer to stand up against the farmers withdrawing water 
illegally”59 
Mr. Santosh Naik in tail end is made it clear that today there is no forum for the 
farmers to voice their opinions on the current management process: 
“There is no interest from the official side, so hard for us to have a 
say in anything to do with management of irrigation water”60 
A WUA would make it easier to participate actively, but the farmer’s lack of 
knowledge, made it hard for him to see how it could be easier in the future. In 
                                              
59 22.03.08 
60 23.03.08 
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head reach, Mr. Sardep Medha made it clear that the whole village would have to 
want a WUA,  
“I am not in a WUA. I don’t know much about it. The whole village 
need to be part of the WUA, not just a few. Our problems would 
reduce with a WUA, but I feel helpless the elders of the town 
should take the initiative. We, [the younger farmers] cannot do it 
[form a WUA] on our own.” 61 
The lack of confidence in what collective participation through a WUA would 
mean, has strong links to the level of knowledge in all three reaches. However, 
with more knowledge, the willingness and the understanding that a collective 
body would be beneficial is possible to achieve in D54. 
7.2.1 Include the farmers more actively 
In order to hear what the farmers themselves meant as the way forward, I asked 
the farmers if they wanted to be included in various governmental actions. I 
specifically asked if they wanted to be involved in the process of setting new 
water tariffs, so as to understand if they where interested in participating in such 
a change. Mr. Krishna Babu in mid reach told me that  
“I believe that it would be good to have a dialogue with the ID 
when new [irrigation water] tariffs are being planned. However, if 
all our [all farmers] opinions are taken into consideration, I don’t 
think the increase will be sufficient. Better if they set a high price, 
and we just have to follow.” 62 
When I asked if Mr. Santosh Naik in tail end wanted to be included in the setting 
of new tariffs, this tail-end farmer answered that he thought “…it is best if the 
farmers are not involved in this process.” This was because it would take away 
the focus of the discussion. The many problems in the tail end are related to 
deeper issues than the actual fee, and listening to the farmers in the tail end might 
not help this particular decision. Mr. Naik thought (as the mid-reach farmer also 
                                              
61 20.03.08 
62 22.03.08 
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pointed out), that the GOK should set the new tariffs. He also pointed out that the 
farmers upstream would probably want to have a say in this, but he himself in his 
reach did not feel the need to be included. Mr. Naik’s presumption was correct as 
in head reach Mr. Pradip Yani was to the point: 
“If the GOI would include me in the process when setting the new 
tariffs – it would off course benefit me as a farmer as if they don’t 
will have huge consequences for me, and I will not have any say at 
all afterwards. If you set the prices according to the water being 
sold, it will affect us, as we are not involved in such a scheme 
today.63  
Mr. Yani was very interested in being part of the decision making, as the 
consequences would mean a lot to him. I believe this shows that the different 
reaches have different demands. However the general lack of trust that your 
opinion is of value predominates – only in head reach is there a strong wish for 
inclusion.  
7.2.2 More technical knowledge 
The issue that three head reach farmers proposed as a way forward, was to know 
more about growing conditions. Interestingly, in retrospect I found that the 
farmers were in fact seeking a working CD. They wanted more facts and advice 
based on local needs, professional help using the latest technology/ equipment 
and helps to increase their yields. Mr. Pradip Yani elaborates:  
 “There has been no one here to test the soils form any of the 
government’s departments, only our own experience results in us 
continuing to grow our crops. No benefits from the government, 
and I have not received any information on the pesticides we are 
using. Would be good to get information on pesticides from the 
government. First, I would like to know which pesticide to use on 
which land. The government should take this initiative, they will 
benefit from us growing and using the land in the right way” 64 
                                              
63 20.03.08 
64 Interview done 20.03.08 
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More information on soil conditions and possibilities to change crop were in the 
mind of Mr Sardep Meda: 
 “Proper testing from the government’s side would be able to tell 
us the likelihood of the soils condition, and help us receive better 
cropping yields. If I was given incentives from the government like 
free fertilizer then I might consider changing [crop]. It would be 
very helpful.” 65 
The possibility to change crop was out of the question unless it was proved 
profitable and possible by the government that the conditions were appropriate. 
Given this advice, he could change crop to something less water intensive in 
head reach, which in turn would better the conditions for the entire minor and 
distributary. What became evident was that the willingness relates to 
technological expertise and an assurance that the new crop would be profitable.  
7.3 Concluding remarks 
In my mind, the current situation in D54 is degrading rather than progressing. 
The farmers are seeking more activity from the IWM institution to improve 
conditions. However, progress in D54 area relies on information and willingness 
from the IWM institution to develop the area. This requires willingness for the 
farmers and the rest of the institution to collaborate as well as between the 
farmers themselves. It also relies on promoting the common goal – the idea of a 
sustainable irrigation system. 
The lack of basic knowledge on what collective action and participation can 
achieve holds the situation at a standstill. The fact that the farmers are showing 
an interest in the concept of a WUA when given information is a promising 
factor improving the chances for success of such an organization in the future.  
If the government and the rest of the IWM institution wanted WUAs in D54, 
then I mean it is possible to set this up. To have this outlined on paper, benefits 
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neither the farmers nor the rest of the IWM institution. In fact, the semi-
functioning WUA is a sign of progress. If the Busupur WUA received consent in 
near future, it would be interesting to see the effect it would have in head reach. 
If in turn the WUA proved to be successful then it would be easier for the 
farmers close to head reach to learn by seeing how it functioned. I hope that this 
could spark off similar organisations and evoke a shift of attitude in favour of the 
collective participation. However, it would also mean a serious investment from 
the IWM institution with staff, time and effort on various levels, in order secure 
this development long term.  
As the farmers have pointed out, the two actions of paying for water and choice 
of crop are rooted in the rational logic of the individual farmer. The fact that only 
the head reach farmers wanted to be included in the process of setting new water 
rates, shows that the rest of the farmers probably could adapt better if the IWM 
institution took the initiative by spreading information, and then leave it to the 
various villages to continue. The fact that head reach farmers see a way forward 
lies in incentives such as free fertilizers, external help, and guidance. Perhaps this 
is the missing incentive for the head reach farmers, to see make it profitable for 
them to establish more WUAs. 
 
 
65 Interview done 20.03.08 
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8. Final concluding remarks 
When asking why collective participation from farmers in Irrigation Water 
Management processes is not progressing in India today? I developed three 
hypotheses. These became the research areas for this thesis, so I could 
understand why collective participation from farmers was not progressing. 
The first hypothesis was confirmed. There are few collective benefits present in 
the farmer’ everyday. Hence, the farmers do not see Water User Associations 
(WUAs) as a realistic alternative to better the current irrigation water 
management process, due to too few benefits for the individual farmer. This is 
the reality in D54. There was little information and few staff from the IWM 
institution to promote the WUA. Farmers seemed to lack an active collective 
attitude. When they did stand together, it was in a crisis i.e. when there was little 
water in the minor or other farmers where violating water distribution.  
The fact that there was little collective participation, made me look at areas 
where the farmers were participating. The act of paying or not paying the water 
irrigation fee can be seen as more than just an individual purpose. The second 
hypothesis was both confirmed and declined as the individual act of paying for 
water is done with the intention of participating in a system (IWM institution) 
more than paying for water as such. 68 % of the interviewed farmers were 
paying the actual fee and the reason for doing so was that they were using the 
water. However, the incentive of a bank loan, corruption and the social 
stigmatization of the farmers who are not paying make me question if the farmers 
are seeking to play by the rules and be part of system that can give them benefits. 
Another area where collective participation could be of benefit was the cropping 
design (CD). Realizing the importance of the crop and the consequences wrong 
crops have in water scarce areas, made this action easier to see and measure. If 
the farmers follow the design, it can be seen as successful communication with 
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the IWM institution. Hence, the third hypothesis the individual choice of crop 
has collective consequences for the farmers in an area, and should therefore be a 
matter of a collective organisation, became confirmed as an ultimate option for 
the farmers. However, few of the farmers knew about the CD. The authorities 
lacked staff to follow up the violations. The CD guidelines promoted had little to 
do with the existing situation. When farmers in the head reach were informed of 
what the CD was they were very positive to receive technical help from higher 
levels. The farmers in mid reach and tail end were more concerned with the 
cropping violations occurring in head reach, and the lack of water – but still 
claimed that if the CD was followed  the this should in theory not occur. 
However, the attitude of the officials’ (laughing attitude) together with the very 
high cropping violations makes it hard to see that the CD will be enforced in near 
future.  
8.1 Possible roads ahead 
I believe there are two more tangible and immediate ways to encourage more 
collective participation in relation to the D54.   
8.1.1 Holistic WUA promotion 
The farmers were eager to have a collective channel working for them and with 
them. Although it is hard to get an agreement between head reach, and tail end 
users – WUAs are a viable tool promoted by the government to empower the 
people at a local level. This ensures resource mobilization (40% of the water 
fees) and a sustainable irrigation system.  
I believe a way forward could be an active information campaign along the entire 
distributary. Local authorities with teams of professional experts could give 
information on seeding and new agricultural technology based on traditional 
methods, and promote the collective benefits of the WUAs. Only when the 
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farmers understand that there are benefits, a WUA will work. The focus has been 
on technical and economical aspects, as these are easier to communicate than 
social and political functions. Such functions must be experienced over time 
before giving results. 
Farmers and officials also gave several other comments. The lack of 
communication between the various departments and the farmers and among the 
farmers themselves, seemed to be the  most common reason for why they thought  
it was little collective progress as well as physical progress to further the 
development of a more sustainable IWM system.  
8.1.2 Strengthen the IWM institution, then give responsibility based 
on trust and respect 
Due to the many leap holes and violations, the farmers now benefit from not 
following the rules. There is a need for strong penalties to be enforced and 
positive cooperation with professional officials.  Corruption was present in D54. 
The lack of staff leaves no one to monitor the farmers or the officials. They too 
are rational beings. The system should have better alternatives to offer than at 
present. Decentralization was indented to abolish these issues. As reality shows, 
40 years down the line – it takes time 
8.2 The goal is a sustainable irrigation system 
The degrading system cannot be fixed by short time solutions using fists and 
shouts. However, the thought of long-term solutions, becomes irrelevant when 
your immediate concerns are on the current yields and possible disastrous 
outcomes. Hence, it is the institutions mission to work for a sustainable solution. 
Neither the farmers on their own in WUA, nor the IWM institution without the 
farmers can function alone, as both are highly relevant parts of the institution. 
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The mid reach and the tail end farmers want higher fees for the water as this 
would cost the excessive users in head reach, hopefully enough to make them 
change. The fact that only head reach farmers want to participate in the setting of 
new tariffs, shows that there is a need for collaboration to deal with unequal 
distribution. To achieve progress, the WUA needs to be rejuvenated and this 
relies on the entire IWM institution to actively want a collective and effective 
local management body. Nevertheless, as Sardep Meda in head reach pointed out   
“When it rains the water is distributed equally to everyone.” Hence, the 
importance of working with a common goal ensuring a balance within the IWM 
system will eventually result in irrigation water in D54 for the next centuries too.  
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